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DISTINGUISHING CARCIERI v. SALAZAR: WHY THE
SUPREME COURT GOT IT WRONG AND HOW
CONGRESS AND COURTS SHOULD RESPOND TO
PRESERVE TRIBAL AND FEDERAL INTERESTS IN THE
IRA’S TRUST-LAND PROVISIONS
Sarah Washburn
Abstract: Section 5 of the Indian Reorganization Act (IRA)1 authorizes the Secretary of
the Interior to acquire and hold land in trust for the purpose of providing land for Indians. In
2009, the Supreme Court held in Carcieri v. Salazar2 that to qualify for the benefits of
Section 5, tribes must show they were under federal jurisdiction at the time the IRA was
enacted in 1934.3 The Carcieri Court then determined that the Narragansett tribe, which
obtained federal recognition in 1983 under the 25 C.F.R. Part 83 recognition process, had not
proven that it was under federal jurisdiction in 1934.4 Carcieri was the first case in which the
Court decoupled jurisdiction from recognition for purposes of the IRA. It could be read to
suggest that federal recognition on its own is not enough to prove federal jurisdiction for
purposes of the IRA and thus threatens the interests of all tribes; especially at risk are tribes
that obtained federal recognition after Congress enacted the IRA. Many of those tribes were
simply overlooked and excluded from a list of recognized tribes compiled upon enactment of
the IRA, and all of them have demonstrable historical relationships with the federal
government. While the Carcieri Court limited its holding to the timing question—that the
phrase “now under federal jurisdiction” in the IRA means that a tribe must prove federal
jurisdiction existed in 1934—it did not consider how tribes might prove such jurisdiction
existed. This Comment argues that tribes recognized after the enactment of the IRA, through
either traditional recognition processes or the recognition procedures set forth in 25 C.F.R.
Part 83, were necessarily under federal jurisdiction in 1934 and should therefore qualify
under the IRA’s Section 5 trust-land provisions. It argues that Congress should respond to
Carcieri with legislation clarifying that all federally recognized tribes were necessarily under
federal jurisdiction in 1934. It further argues that until Congress acts, courts should allow
tribes recognized after 1934 to prove through additional evidence that such jurisdiction
existed.

INTRODUCTION
The Cheyenne River Sioux tribe’s documented history stretches back

1. Wheeler-Howard (Indian Reorganization) Act, Pub. L. No. 73-383, 48 Stat. 984 (1934)
(codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 461–479 (2006)).
2. 555 U.S. __ (Feb. 24, 2009), 129 S. Ct. 1058 (2009).
3. Id. at __, 129 S. Ct. at 1068. The Court interpreted the definition of “Indian” in Section 19 of
the IRA to mean that tribes must have been under federal jurisdiction in 1934, when the IRA was
enacted, to benefit from the IRA’s trust-land provisions.
4. See id.
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to the mid-seventeenth century, when European explorers encountered
the tribe’s Sioux ancestors living in central Minnesota and northwestern
Wisconsin.5 After the American Revolution, the tribe experienced rocky
relations with the United States government until the Treaty of Fort
Laramie established the Great Sioux Reservation.6 In 1935, the tribe was
approved as an organized, recognized tribe7 under the Indian
Reorganization Act (IRA).8
The documented history of the Narragansett tribe dates back to 1614.
That tribe achieved federal recognition under the 25 C.F.R. Part 83
procedures in 1983,9 which means that, among other things, the tribe
demonstrated it had been “identified as an American Indian entity on a
substantially continuous basis since 1900” and “existed as a community
from historical times until the present.”10
Both tribes have extensive documented histories confirming their
status as American Indian entities. However, under the 2009 Supreme
Court decision in Carcieri v. Salazar,11 the Cheyenne River Sioux tribe
can have land held in trust under Section 5 of the IRA, but the
Narragansett tribe cannot. Carcieri held that to qualify for the IRA’s
trust-land provisions, a tribe had to have been under federal jurisdiction
in 1934—the year Congress enacted the IRA.12 While the Court did not
consider what evidence might prove that a particular tribe was subject to
such jurisdiction, it did conclude that the Narragansett tribe had not
proved it was under federal jurisdiction in 1934.13 As a result, courts
5. See GUY E. GIBBON, THE SIOUX: THE DAKOTA AND LAKOTA NATIONS 3 (Blackwell
Publishing 2003); see also Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe Website, http://www.sioux.org (last visited
May 11, 2010) (providing additional information on the history and culture of the Cheyenne River
Sioux).
6. See Treaty with the Sioux Indians, 15 Stat. 635 (Apr. 29, 1868).
7. The Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe’s Constitution was approved by the Secretary of the Interior
in accordance with the provisions of the IRA in December 1935. See CONST. AND BY-LAWS OF THE
CHEYENNE RIVER SIOUX TRIBE OF SOUTH DAKOTA (Dec. 27, 1935), available at
http://www.state.sd.us/oia/files/chysiouxcon.pdf (last visited June 23, 2010).
8. Wheeler-Howard (Indian Reorganization) Act, Pub. L. No. 73-383, 48 Stat. 984 (1934)
(codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 461–479 (2006)).
9. See Final Determination for Federal Acknowledgment of Narragansett Indian Tribe of Rhode
Island, 48 Fed. Reg. 6177 (Feb. 10, 1983). The federal government found that the “Narragansett
community and its predecessors have existed autonomously since first contact . . . [t]he tribe has a
documented history dating from 1614.” Id. at 6178.
10. These are among the requirements for recognition under 25 C.F.R. Part 83. See 25 C.F.R. §
83.7 (2009).
11. 555 U.S. __ (Feb. 24, 2009), 129 S. Ct. 1058 (2009).
12. Id. at __, 129 S. Ct. at 1068.
13. Id. The Narragansetts were recognized as a tribe under 25 C.F.R. Part 83, but the Court held
that “[n]one of the parties or amici, including the Narragansett Tribe itself, has argued that the Tribe
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may be tempted to rely on the 1934 list of tribes organized and
recognized under the IRA to determine which tribes satisfy Carcieri,14
but such a response would create a dividing line that excludes tribes
recognized after 1934 from the IRA’s trust land benefits.
However and whenever it is attained, federal recognition has
important consequences for Indian tribes. Recognition qualifies tribes
for statutory benefits, affects tribal land ownership, and, above all,
formalizes the historic trust relationship between tribes and the federal
government, thus qualifying tribes for federal protection of their
sovereignty and property.15 Since 1934, the government has recognized
hundreds of tribes through traditional methods (including treaties,
congressional legislation, executive orders, and other clear evidence of
federal-tribal relations) and through the formal recognition process
adopted in 1978, which is currently codified as amended at 25 C.F.R.
Part 83.16 Under the latter process, a tribe seeking recognition must
prove, among other things, historical existence as a community and
identification as an American Indian entity since 1900.17
As a part of the historical federal-tribal trust relationship, the federal
government has protected Indian land, including taking land into trust
for tribes to protect against encroachment by states or private citizens.18
Congress codified this process in Section 5 of the IRA, which authorizes
the Secretary of the Interior to acquire interests in land for the purpose of
providing land for “Indians,”19 defined as “persons of Indian descent
who are members of any recognized Indian tribe now under Federal
jurisdiction.”20 Since 1934, the Department of the Interior has allowed
land to be held in trust for tribes recognized under 25 C.F.R. Part 83, as
was under federal jurisdiction in 1934.” Id.
14. See infra Part III.C (describing the IRA list and its exclusion of many potentially eligible
tribes).
15. See COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW § 3.02[3] (Nell Jessup Newton et al. eds.,
2005) [hereinafter COHEN] (discussing the legal and political implications of federal recognition).
16. See Procedures for Establishing that an American Indian Group Exists as an Indian Tribe, 43
Fed. Reg. 39,361 (Sept. 5, 1978) (codified at 25 C.F.R. pt. 83 (2009)).
17. See 25 C.F.R. § 83.7 (2009).
18. Protection for tribal land began with the doctrine of discovery espoused by European
explorers and continued with the Proclamation of 1763 and the Trade and Intercourse Act of 1790.
See
The
Royal
Proclamation,
1763,
3
Geo.
3
(Eng.),
available
at
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/proc1763.asp (last visited May 4, 2010); see also infra Part
I.B (analyzing federal protection and control over Indian lands); infra note 50 and accompanying
text (describing the doctrine of discovery).
19. Wheeler-Howard (Indian Reorganization) Act, Pub. L. No. 73-383, § 5, 48 Stat. 984, 985
(1934) (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 465 (2006)).
20. Id. § 19 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 479).
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well as for tribes recognized through traditional means after 1934.21
However, in Carcieri v. Salazar, the Supreme Court limited the scope of
the IRA’s trust-land provisions and instilled doubt concerning the ability
of tribes recognized after 1934 to have land held in trust by the federal
government. The Court held that the Narragansett tribe, which was
unrecognized at the time of the IRA’s enactment in 1934 but obtained
federal recognition in 1983 through the 25 C.F.R. Part 83 process, did
not qualify to have land held in trust under the IRA.22 The Court read the
IRA’s definition of “Indian” to mean that the Secretary’s trust authority
is limited to “those tribes that were under the federal jurisdiction of the
United States when the IRA was enacted in 1934.”23 Despite the fact that
the Narragansett tribe did not have a chance to argue the jurisdiction
issue,24 the Court found that the tribe failed to prove it was under federal
jurisdiction in 1934 and did not qualify for the benefits of Section 5 of
the IRA.25
Congress responded to Carcieri in September 2009 by introducing
Senate Bill 1703, a bill “[t]o amend the [IRA of 1934], to reaffirm the
authority of the Secretary of the Interior to take land into trust for Indian
tribes.”26 The bill, if passed, would allow any federally recognized
Indian tribe, regardless of the date of recognition, to benefit from the
trust-land provisions of the IRA.27 The Senate Committee on Indian
Affairs considered the bill and reported it on December 17, 2009.28 As of
this writing, Congress has taken no further action on the bill.
Nonetheless, the Committee’s consideration of S. 1703 demonstrates
congressional recognition that Carcieri may require a legislative fix.
Carcieri calls into question the ability of tribes recognized after 1934
to have land held in trust pursuant to Section 5 of the IRA. This
Comment argues that tribes formally recognized by traditional methods
since 1934, as well as tribes recognized under 25 C.F.R. Part 83, were

21. See infra Part IV (providing examples of tribes that were recognized after 1934 and have
since had land held in trust by the federal government under Section 5 of the IRA).
22. Carcieri v. Salazar, 555 U.S. __ (Feb. 24, 2009), 129 S. Ct. 1058, 1068 (2009).
23. Id.
24. See infra Part V.B (describing the Court’s approach to the federal jurisdiction issue in
Carcieri).
25. Carcieri, 555 U.S. at __, 129 S. Ct. at 1068.
26. S. 1703, 111th Cong. § 1 (as reported by S. Comm. on Indian Affairs, Dec. 17, 2009).
27. Id.
28. See GovTrack, http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=s111-1703 (last visited May 4,
2010).
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necessarily under federal jurisdiction in 1934 and thus should be eligible
for the benefits of Section 5 of the IRA.
Part I provides an overview of the history of federal plenary power
over Indian affairs and its implications for Indian property ownership.
Part II describes one historical implication of the plenary power
doctrine, namely the duties and responsibilities owed to tribes by the
federal government as a result of the federal-tribal trust relationship. Part
III details the various approaches to tribal recognition that the federal
government has used throughout the history of federal-tribal relations,
including an analysis of the IRA’s approach to recognition and the
problems caused by that approach. Part IV details the experiences of
several tribes that went unrecognized under the IRA in 1934 but were
subsequently recognized by traditional means of recognition or by the
modern 25 C.F.R. Part 83 recognition process. Part V introduces
Carcieri v. Salazar, a decision that affects the interests of tribes
recognized after 1934.
Finally, Part VI argues that because tribes formally recognized since
1934 were necessarily under federal jurisdiction in 1934, they should
qualify for IRA Section 5 benefits regardless of date or method of
recognition and that finding otherwise conflicts with express federal
policy, long-standing principles of Indian law, and principles underlying
federal-tribal relationships. Congress should legislate to require such a
result. Until then, courts should distinguish Carcieri because the tribe in
that case, which was recognized under 25 C.F.R. Part 83, did not argue
the question of jurisdiction. Thus, tribes recognized through 25 C.F.R.
Part 83 might still introduce additional evidence and successfully prove
such jurisdiction existed. All other recognized tribes were necessarily
under federal jurisdiction in 1934.
I.

THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT POSSESSES PLENARY
POWER OVER INDIAN AFFAIRS

Plenary power over Indian affairs stems from a long history of
relations between tribes, European explorers, colonists, and, eventually,
the United States government.29 From the beginning of the new
American Republic, the government viewed tribes as dependent wards

29. See Washington v. Confederated Bands & Tribes of Yakima Indian Nation, 439 U.S. 463,
470–71 (1979) (describing Congress’s “plenary and exclusive” power over Indian affairs); see also
COHEN, supra note 15, § 5.01[1] (providing a general overview of the sources of federal power over
Indian affairs).
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over which Congress had broad powers of control.30 This Part illustrates
that the plenary power doctrine looms large in Indian law and has broad
implications for all aspects of the federal-tribal relationship, including
federal control over Indian property ownership and federal jurisdiction
over tribes within Indian country.
A.

Plenary Power Developed from Constitutional and ExtraConstitutional Sources and Played a Key Role in the Historical
Development of Federal-Tribal Relations

Congressional plenary power over Indian affairs reflects a long
history of conflict and compromise in the arena of federal-tribal
relations. This broad federal power has both constitutional and extraconstitutional sources.
Congress derives its plenary power over Indian affairs from several
provisions of the Constitution, the most important of which31 are the
Indian Commerce Clause32 and the Treaty Clause.33 The Supreme Court
has recognized that these provisions grant Congress broad authority to
legislate with respect to Indian affairs34 and has confirmed Congress’s
power to impose federal law on tribes even without their consent,
including the abrogation of treaty rights.35 In addition to these
provisions, the Necessary and Proper Clause36 broadens the reach of
federal power, and the Supremacy Clause37 ensures that federal laws
concerning Indian affairs preempt conflicting state laws.38 Today, the

30. See United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 384–85 (1886) (“The power of the General
Government over these remnants of a race once powerful, now weak and diminished in numbers, is
necessary to their protection, as well as to the safety of those among whom they dwell. It must exist
in that government, because it has never existed anywhere else, because the theatre of its exercise is
within the geographical limits of the United States, because it has never been denied, and because it
alone can enforce its laws on all the tribes.”).
31. See COHEN, supra note 15, § 5.01[1], at 390–91 (noting that the “Indian commerce clause and
the treaty clause are most often cited today as the constitutional bases for legislation regarding
Indian tribes”).
32. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
33. Id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
34. See United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 200 (2004).
35. See id. at 202 (“Congress, with this Court’s approval, has interpreted the Constitution’s
‘plenary’ grants of power as authorizing it to enact legislation that both restricts and, in turn, relaxes
those restrictions on tribal sovereign authority.”); see also Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553,
566 (1903) (noting that “as with treaties made with foreign nations, the legislative power might pass
laws in conflict with treaties made with the Indians”) (citations omitted).
36. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
37. Id. art. VI, cl. 2
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imposition of federal law on the tribes is subject to constitutional
limitations such as the Due Process Clause39 and the Takings Clause,40
and tribes may obtain judicial review of federal assertions of power.41
In addition to affirmative grants of power contained within the
Constitution, extra-constitutional powers serve as a source of plenary
power. Under one theory, Congress’s power arises directly from the
dependent status of tribes and their relationship with the federal
government; as wards of the government, tribes are subject to the
overriding authority of Congress in handling Indian affairs and
managing and protecting Indian land and assets.42 Under a second
theory, the Supreme Court has recognized the “Constitution’s adoption
of preconstitutional powers necessarily inherent in any Federal
Government, namely, powers that this Court has described as ‘necessary
concomitants of nationality.’”43 Under this approach, “national power in
Indian affairs descended to the national government from Great Britain
38. See COHEN, supra note 15, § 5.01[1] (discussing these and other constitutional provisions
from which federal plenary power derives).
39. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
40. Id.
41. See COHEN, supra note 15, § 2.01[3]. The Court once viewed the exercise of congressional
plenary power as a political issue “not subject to be controlled by the judicial department of the
government.” Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 565 (1903). However, in 1946 the Indian
Claims Commission was established to settle claims of tribes against the government; under the
Indian Claims Commission Act, tribes were given five years to bring their historical claims (claims
arising before 1946). See Indian Claims Commission Act, ch. 959, § 12, 60 Stat. 1049 (1946); see
also COHEN, supra note 15, § 5.06[3] (discussing the purposes and effects of the Indian Claims
Commission Act). Claims arising after 1946 are currently brought in the Court of Federal Claims,
which has jurisdiction under the Tucker Act and the Indian Tucker Act to hear claims arising under
the Constitution, laws and treaties of the United States, and Executive orders. See Act of Mar. 3,
1887 (Tucker Act), ch. 359, 24 Stat. 505 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1491(2006)); Act of Aug. 13, 1946
(Indian Tucker Act), ch. 959, § 24, 60 Stat. 1055 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1505(2006)); see also
COHEN, supra note 15, § 5.06[4][c] (describing Tucker Act and Indian Tucker Act jurisdiction). For
a modern example of judicial review of congressional action regarding tribal land, see United States
v. Sioux Nation, 448 U.S. 371, 423–24 (1980) (invalidating the Act of Feb. 28, 1877, which
abrogated the Fort Laramie Treaty and effected a taking of Sioux tribal property).
42. See Lone Wolf, 187 U.S. at 567 (“From [the tribes’] very weakness and helplessness, so
largely due to the course of dealing of the Federal government with them and the treaties in which it
has been promised, there arises the duty of protection, and with it the power. This has always been
recognized by the Executive and by Congress, and by this court, whenever the question has
arisen.”); see also United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 380 (1886) (“[T]his power of Congress
to organize territorial governments, and make laws for their inhabitants, arises not so much from the
clause in the Constitution in regard to disposing of and making rules and regulations concerning the
Territory and other property of the United States, as from the ownership of the country in which the
Territories are, and the right of exclusive sovereignty which must exist in the National Government,
and can be found nowhere else.”).
43. United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 201 (2004) (citing United States v. Curtiss-Wright, 299
U.S. 304, 318 (1936)).
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and therefore does not require an explicit grant of power in the
Constitution for its exercise.”44
Both Congress and the President exercise federal plenary power, and
the federal Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) plays a key role in the use of
this power within the context of federal-tribal relations.45 Executive
authority in the field of Indian affairs “generally flows from the
President to the Secretary of the Interior and is then further delegated to
the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA), an agency within the Interior
Department.”46 Statutes and other congressional actions related to Indian
affairs usually delegate administrative authority to the Secretary of the
Interior, who then delegates to the BIA for implementation.47 The BIA’s
administrative power covers three broad areas: Indian trust asset
management; involvement in tribal governmental affairs; and social
services, including health, welfare, education, housing, and other
programs.48
B.

Plenary Power Justifies Vast Federal Powers of Control over
Indian Property Ownership

To understand the government’s modern view of federal power over
property held by individual Indians and Indian tribes, it is helpful to
consider the development of this power throughout the history of
federal-tribal relations. Historical and modern examples suggest that the
plenary power doctrine provides the basis for federal power over Indian
property ownership.
Throughout the early history of federal-tribal relations, development
of the plenary power doctrine led to increasing federal control over
Indian property ownership. From the beginning of Indian relations with
the newly established United States,49 the federal government held the
fee title to Indian property in trust for the tribes and possessed a

44. COHEN, supra note 15, § 5.01[4], at 397.
45. See id. § 5.03[1], at 403–04.
46. id.
47. See id. at 404.
48. See id.
49. Under British rule in the Americas, the Royal Proclamation of 1763 reserved certain land
under the dominion and protection of the crown for use by the Indians, preventing settlement by
whites in the reserved areas. See The Royal Proclamation, 1763, 3 Geo. 3 (Eng.), available at
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/proc1763.asp (last visited May 4, 2010). This idea of
government authority over Indian lands passed to the new Republic. See COHEN, supra note 15,
§ 15.03, at 967.
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preemptive power concerning acquisition of Indian lands.50 This strong
preemptive power arose from the dependent status of tribes and the
perceived need for the government to exercise its powers of protection
and control over tribes when transfers of Indian land were involved.51
Throughout the years, the federal right of preemption has justified broad
congressional power to act concerning tribal property interests, including
granting leases and rights of way on Indian lands, terminating trust
status, and imposing, modifying, or removing restrictions on the sale or
transfer (alienation) of Indian lands.52 Early Supreme Court decisions
upheld the idea of broad federal control over Indian property ownership
and helped to legitimize federal restrictions on alienation.53 In addition,

50. See Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. 543, 587 (1823) (“The United States, then, have
unequivocally acceded to that great and broad rule by which its civilized inhabitants now hold this
country. They hold, and assert in themselves, the title by which it was acquired. They maintain, as
all others have maintained, that discovery gave an exclusive right to extinguish the Indian title of
occupancy, either by purchase or by conquest; and gave also a right to such a degree of sovereignty,
as the circumstances of the people would allow them to exercise.”). The M’Intosh Court noted that
the government received “complete ultimate title, charged with [the Indian] right of possession,
and . . . the exclusive power of acquiring that right.” Id. at 603. See also COHEN, supra note 15,
§ 15.06[1] (describing federal protection of tribal land and its origin in the doctrine of discovery).
51. Several Supreme Court cases provide analysis of the plenary power doctrine stemming from
the dependent status of tribes. See, e.g., United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 201 (2004) (noting that
plenary power stems partly from “affirmative grants of the Constitution” and partly from the
Constitution’s “adoption of preconstitutional powers necessarily inherent in any Federal
Government, namely, powers that this Court has described as ‘necessary concomitants of
nationality’” (quoting United States v. Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. 304, 318 (1936))); Lone Wolf v.
Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 565 (1903) (“Plenary authority over the tribal relations of the Indians has
been exercised by Congress from the beginning, and the power has always been deemed a political
one . . . .”); United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 383–84 (1886) (“Indian tribes are the wards of
the nation. They are communities dependent on the United States . . . . From their very weakness
and helplessness, so largely due to the course of dealing of the Federal Government with them and
the treaties in which it has been promised, there arises the duty of protection, and with it the
power.”).
52. See generally COHEN, supra note 15, § 5.02[4] (describing federal power over Indian
property). Restriction on alienation of Indian property is a theme present from historical times to
today. As early as 1790, Congress exercised its exclusive power over Indian affairs, derived from
the Indian Commerce Clause, when it passed the Trade and Intercourse Act banning the transfer of
Indian title to any state or person unless made by a treaty under federal authority. See Act of July
22, 1790, ch. 33, § 4, 1 Stat. 137, 138 (“And be it enacted and declared, That no sale of lands made
by any Indians, or any nation or tribe of Indians within the United States, shall be valid to any
person or persons, or to any state . . . unless the same shall be made and duly executed at some
public treaty, held under the authority of the United States.”). This restriction is currently codified in
the United States Code in nearly identical form: “No purchase, grant, lease, or other conveyance of
lands, or of any title or claim thereto, from any Indian nation or tribe of Indians, shall be of any
validity in law or equity, unless the same be made by treaty or convention entered into pursuant to
the Constitution.” 25 U.S.C. § 177 (2006).
53. Johnson v. M’Intosh established the federal-tribal relationship regarding alienation of Indian
land, holding that the doctrine of discovery invalidates alienation of Indian title without the consent
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the development of the federal-tribal trust relationship, which establishes
responsibilities and duties owed by the federal government to the tribes,
has greatly influenced federal power in Indian property holding.54
The modern view of Indian property holding recognizes several
sources of Indian land ownership rights, the most relevant being treaties,
executive actions, and acts of Congress.55 Treaties and executive orders
are no longer used to reserve land for tribes, but they remain important
because the federal government still recognizes Indian lands previously
set aside under these methods.56 The final source of recognized Indian
of the European sovereign (or consent of the United States as a successor nation) and gives the
sovereign the exclusive power to purchase Indian land. 21 U.S. at 603–05. In the mid-nineteenth
century, the federal government’s interest in tribal land was reconceived as a trustee’s fee title, and
the tribal interest as beneficial ownership under trust. See COHEN, supra note 15, § 5.04[4][a], at
419–20. In Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, the Supreme Court noted that Indians have an
“unquestionable, and, heretofore, unquestioned right to the lands they occupy, until that right shall
be extinguished by a voluntary cession to our government . . . .” 30 U.S. 1, 17 (1831). One year
later, in Worcester v. Georgia, the Supreme Court enunciated the “universal conviction that the
Indian nations possessed a full right to the lands they occupied, until that right should be
extinguished by the United States, with their consent . . . that, within their boundary, they possessed
rights with which no state could interfere: and that the whole power of regulating the intercourse
with them, was vested in the United States.” 31 U.S. 515, 560 (1832).
54. See infra Part II for further explanation of the federal-tribal trust relationship. Plenary power
and the trust relationship are intertwined, as is demonstrated by one issue in particular having great
importance for the tribes and the government—the taking of Indian land without compensation.
Broad congressional power over Indian landholding has been used to justify the taking or
modification of Indian lands, but as long as the federal government recognizes Indian title (right of
possession or occupation), and thus when property rights have vested in the tribe, the United States
must pay just compensation for the taking or destruction of such property. See United States v.
Sioux Nation, 448 U.S. 371, 416–17 (1980) (distinguishing between cases in which the government
acts as a trustee and merely changes the form of trust assets, and cases in which the government acts
as a sovereign and takes recognized title from tribes; in the latter case, the Court investigates the
adequacy of the consideration provided in order to determine if an unconstitutional taking of land
has occurred). Recognition of the Indian right of permanent occupancy must be established by
congressional intent to accord legal rights, not merely permissive occupation. See Tee-Hit-Ton
Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 272, 278–79 (1955). If the federal government does not recognize
Indian title to a particular piece of land, tribes have no right to compensation for the taking of the
land. Id. at 288–89 (“The line of cases adjudicating Indian rights on American soil leads to the
conclusion that Indian occupancy, not specifically recognized as ownership by action authorized by
Congress, may be extinguished by the Government without compensation.”).
55. See COHEN, supra note 15, § 15.04[1], at 969 (introducing tribal acquisition of interests in
real property).
56. A rider attached to the Indian Appropriation Act of 1871 prospectively banned treaty-making,
but since that Act, tribes have had their lands recognized in other ways. See Act of Mar. 3, 1871, ch.
120, §1, 16 Stat. 544, 566 (“Provided, That hereafter no Indian nation or tribe within the territory of
the United States shall be acknowledged or recognized as an independent nation, tribe, or power
with whom the United States may contract by treaty.”) (codified in part at 25 U.S.C. §71 (2006));
ROBERT T. ANDERSON ET AL., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW: CASES AND COMMENTARY 89–90 (2008);
see also Antoine v. Washington, 420 U.S. 194, 202–03 (1975) (discussing the 1871 rider and noting
that the ban on treaty-making “meant no more, however, than that after 1871 relations with Indians
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title, recognition by act of Congress, is the primary method in use
today.57 Congress may set aside lands by using statutes, agreements, or
other acts, ranging from specific grants of fee simple rights to broad
designations that a certain area must be used for the benefit of Indians or
that Indian occupancy must be respected by third parties.58
Two specific examples illustrate the breadth of the federal
government’s modern power over Indian property ownership. First,
Section 5 of the IRA plays an important role in governing land
acquisition and consolidation; it authorizes the Secretary of the Interior
to acquire interests in lands for the purpose of providing land for
Indians.59 Second, the BIA exercises a variety of powers within the field
of Indian affairs; most relevant for showing federal control over Indian
would be governed by Acts of Congress and not by treaty.” The rider banning future treaty-making
is of dubious constitutionality. The Constitution grants the treaty power to the Senate and the
President; such an affirmative grant of power cannot be changed by ordinary legislation. See
ANDERSON at 89–90. In short, the 1871 rider to the appropriations bill is “constitutionally suspect.”
Lara, 541 U.S. at 218 (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment). Congress barred the creation of
executive order reservations in 1919. See Act of June 30, 1919, ch. 4, § 27, 41 Stat. 3, 34 (“That
hereafter no public lands of the United States shall be withdrawn by Executive Order, proclamation,
or otherwise, for or as an Indian reservation except by act of Congress.”). However, for most
purposes the executive order reservations already established at that time have the same validity and
status as a treaty- or statute-based reservation. See United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734, 745 n.8
(1986) (“Indian reservations created by statute, agreement, or executive order normally carry with
them the same implicit hunting rights as those created by treaty.”). Reservations created by
executive order before 1919 have been confirmed by federal statute and also by congressional
acquiescence. See COHEN, supra note 15, § 15.04[4], at 983. However, some doubt surrounds the
status of such reservations. Unless Congress later ratified the executive order reservation or
otherwise recognized the Indian title, the reservation is not considered to be held by recognized title.
Congress theoretically has the power to abolish such reservations, take the lands, and not be subject
to a takings claim by the Indians. See ANDERSON at 227–28 (noting that Congress’s ability to
abolish executive order reservations could lead to “incredible harshness” toward the tribes).
57. See COHEN, supra note 15, § 15.04[3][b], at 978 (noting that since the end of treaty-making in
1871, specific acts of Congress have recognized tribal property rights in land); see also id. §
15.04[5], at 985 (explaining that fee simple lands held by tribes may be placed in trust by acts of
Congress).
58. id. § 15.04[3][b], at 978. Congress uses two basic kinds of statutes to provide land for
Indians: statutes that withdraw public land for the benefit of tribes and statutes that enable the
purchase or condemnation of private land for tribal use. See, e.g., Act of Aug. 4, 1978, Pub. L. No.
95-337, 92 Stat. 455 (holding former public lands in trust for the benefit of the Paiute and Shoshone
tribes); Act of May 24, 1940, ch. 206, 54 Stat. 219 (authorizing the Secretary of the Interior to
purchase private lands and hold them in trust for the Indians of the Turtle Mountain reservation).
59. Wheeler-Howard (Indian Reorganization) Act, Pub. L. No. 73-383, § 5, 48 Stat. 984, 985
(1934) (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 465 (2006)). The Secretary must determine that at least one of three
conditions exists before taking land into trust under Section 5: the acquired lands must either be
within the exterior borders of an existing reservation or adjacent to it; the tribe must already own an
interest in the land; or acquisition must be necessary to facilitate tribal self-determination, economic
development, or housing needs. See 25 C.F.R. § 151.3 (2009). The workings of the IRA are
discussed infra, Part III.B.
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property ownership is the BIA’s trust management power.60 The BIA has
promulgated regulations relating to Indian trust assets, including
regulations governing the acquisition and holding of land in trust for
tribes and individual Indians under the IRA,61 the removal of restrictions
on alienation of Indian allotments,62 the approval or cancellation of
leases of tribal trust lands,63 and the management of other issues related
to tribal land.64
C.

“Indian Country” Encompasses Broad Notions of Indian Property
Ownership and Federal Control over Indian-Held Lands

Because landholding is of such critical social and economic
importance to tribes, federal power in this area continues to be an
important part of federal-tribal relations. Under the plenary power
doctrine, federal power and jurisdiction extend to lands qualifying as
“Indian country.”65
During the early development of federal-tribal relations, no clear
definition of “Indian country” prevailed; the federal government
generally considered Indian country to be “country within which Indian
laws and customs and federal laws relating to Indians” applied.66 Despite
60. For general information on the nature and scope of the BIA’s powers, see supra Part I.A.
61. See 25 C.F.R. pt. 151 (2009).
62. See id. pt. 152 (2009).
63. See id. pt. 162 (2009).
64. Other examples of federal power exercised over Indian lands through the BIA are regulations
governing the leasing of mineral resources, water resources, and timber on tribal lands; regulations
concerning activities of Indian traders on Indian land; and regulations concerning how Indians may
use their trust land, particularly in the context of the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act. See COHEN,
supra note 15, § 5.03[3][a]–[b] (describing principles of federal trust management).
65. Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie, 522 U.S. 520, 527 n.1 (1998) (“Generally speaking,
primary jurisdiction over land that is Indian country rests with the Federal Government and the
Indian tribe inhabiting it, and not with the States.”).
66. COHEN, supra note 15, § 3.04[1], at 182. Primary federal jurisdiction was established, albeit
vaguely at times, by several early statutes. For example, the Trade and Intercourse Act of 1790
imposed penalties for being present in “Indian country” with merchandise usually sold to Indians,
without having obtained an Indian trader license from the federal government. See Act of July 22,
1790, ch. 33, § 3, 1 Stat. 137, 138. The Act also extended federal criminal jurisdiction to crimes
committed by non-Indians against Indians in “any town, settlement, or territory belonging to any
nation or tribe of Indians.” Id. § 5, 1 Stat. at 138. Other acts of Congress at the time used similar
language to describe the vague notion of Indian territory. See COHEN, supra note 15, § 3.04[2][b]
(describing early ideas about the extent of Indian country). It was not until the Trade and Intercourse
Act of 1834 that a formal definition of Indian country emerged. See Act of June 30, 1834, ch. 161,
§ 1, 4 Stat. 729, 729 (defining Indian country as “all that part of the United States west of the
Mississippi, and not within the states of Missouri and Louisiana, or the territory of Arkansas, and,
also, that part of the United States east of the Mississippi river, and not within any state to which the
Indian title has not been extinguished”). However, due to changed conditions in land ownership and
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its vague nature, the Indian country concept was important because it
established primary federal jurisdiction over Indian lands, thus
preempting state taxation or other state regulation in Indian country.67
In the late nineteenth century, lacking a definition of Indian country,
the Supreme Court clarified the term in a series of decisions that would
serve as the foundation of the modern Indian country statute.68 First, in
Donnelly v. United States,69 the Court held that Indian reservations
established after statehood by executive orders issued pursuant to federal
statutes qualified as Indian country.70 The same year, the Court in United
States v. Sandoval71 expanded the idea of Indian country, holding that
the United States has “the power and the duty of exercising a fostering
care and protection over all dependent Indian communities within its
borders.”72 Finally, the Court addressed the issue of Indian allotments in
United States v. Pelican73 and United States v. Ramsey,74 holding that
both trust allotments and restricted fee allotments qualify as Indian
country.75 Congress finally codified these ideas—namely that Indian

settlement, this definition was omitted from the statute books in 1874. See R.S. § 5596, 1 Rev. Stat.
1085 (effective June 22, 1874).
67. See supra note 65; see also Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 561 (1832) (declaring the
Cherokee nation to be “a distinct community occupying its own territory, with boundaries
accurately described, in which the laws of Georgia can have no force”).
68. See COHEN, supra note 15, § 3.04[2][b], at 186.
69. 228 U.S. 243 (1913).
70. Id. at 269 ( “[N]othing can more appropriately be deemed ‘Indian country,’ . . . than a tract of
land that, being a part of the public domain, is lawfully set apart as an Indian reservation.”). Thus, if
the federal government created reservations for tribes, Indian country could exist within the
boundaries of a state, even if the land was not part of the tribe’s aboriginal title. See COHEN, supra
note 15, § 3.04[2][b], at 186–87.
71. 231 U.S. 28 (1913).
72. Id. at 46. This notion of “dependent Indian communities” was reaffirmed in United States v.
McGowan, in which the Court held that land purchased in Nevada after statehood by the federal
government and held in trust for Indians was Indian country; the Court found that Congress had set
the land aside for the “protection of a dependent people” and that it could not be distinguished from
Indian country. 302 U.S. 535, 538–39 (1938).
73. 232 U.S. 442 (1914).
74. 271 U.S. 467 (1926).
75. In Pelican, the Court held that a trust allotment was Indian country, noting that the question is
whether the land “had been validly set apart for the use of the Indians as such, under the
superintendence of the Government.” 232 U.S. at 449. The same idea was expressed in Ramsey,
where the Court held that a restricted fee allotment also qualified as Indian country and noted that
“it would be quite unreasonable to attribute to Congress an intention to extend the protection of the
criminal law to an Indian upon a trust allotment and withhold it from one upon a restricted
allotment; and we find nothing in the nature of the subject matter or in the words of the statute
which would justify us in applying the term Indian country to one and not to the other.” 271 U.S. at
471–72.
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reservations, “dependent Indian communities,” and allotment lands all
constituted Indian country—in 1948.76
The United States Code, which contains the 1948 Indian country
statute, sets forth the current definition of Indian country:
[T]he term “Indian country”, as used in this chapter, means (a)
all land within the limits of any Indian reservation under the
jurisdiction of the United States Government . . . (b) all
dependent Indian communities within the borders of the United
States whether within the original or subsequently acquired
territory thereof, and whether within or without the limits of a
state, and (c) all Indian allotments, the Indian titles to which
have not been extinguished . . . .77
The Indian country statute sets forth the areas where federal law, not
state law, will apply.78 The presumption of federal jurisdiction in Indian
country—absent clear congressional intent to the contrary—exemplifies
the broad federal authority over Indian affairs and property ownership
that stems from the federal plenary power doctrine.79
II.

THE FEDERAL-TRIBAL TRUST RELATIONSHIP CREATES
FEDERAL OBLIGATIONS REGARDING TRIBES AND
TRIBAL LANDS

As a consequence of federal plenary power and the historical federaltribal relationship, the federal government has assumed responsibilities
and duties concerning the protection and management of American
Indian tribes.80 The trust doctrine represents “one of the cornerstones of
Indian law”81 and serves as recognition of the federal government’s
special “obligation to protect tribal sovereignty and property.”82 This
Part describes the history of the federal-tribal trust relationship and its

76. See Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 645, 62 Stat. 757 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (2006)).
77. See 18 U.S.C. § 1151.
78. See Alaska v. Native Vill. of Venetie, 522 U.S. 520, 527 n.1 (1998); see also COHEN, supra
note 15, § 3.04[1] (discussing the significance of Indian country status and the application of federal
and tribal law in Indian country).
79. See COHEN, supra note 15, § 3.04[1], at 183 (“Territory classified as Indian country continues
to exist as such unless and until Congress clearly expresses its intent to diminish or terminate the
Indian country status.”).
80. See generally id. § 5.04[4] (detailing the historical development of the trust relationship
doctrine and explaining how the trust responsibility evolved from early treaties, statutes, and
Supreme Court opinions).
81. Id. § 5.04[4][a], at 419.
82. Id. at 420.
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continuing pertinence in modern-day Indian affairs. One application of
the trust relationship is the role federal courts play in construing various
sources of federal power as implying a corresponding duty to the tribes;
in doing so, courts use Indian law canons of construction to protect
Indian interests.
A.

The Federal-Tribal Trust Relationship Developed from Ideas
About the Proper Role of the Federal Government in Managing
Indian Affairs

Federal power over Indian affairs originated at the very inception of
United States history; after the American Revolution, the United States
assumed all powers previously held by the British Crown concerning
Indian affairs.83 The Constitution acknowledged the federal
government’s broad inherent power over Indian affairs by granting
Congress the power to regulate commerce with Indian tribes,84 by
declaring federal supremacy over state law,85 and by giving the
executive the power to make treaties with Indian tribes.86 These
provisions ensured federal control in Indian affairs, but the early
Supreme Court cases of Johnson v. M’Intosh,87 Cherokee Nation v.
Georgia,88 and Worcester v. Georgia89 established the idea that such
expansive federal control implies a corresponding duty to protect tribal
interests.90 This duty, commonly called the federal-tribal trust
83. See Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. 543, 574–88 (1823) (discussing early European rule and the
United States’s accession to power).
84. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
85. Id. art. VI, cl. 2.
86. Id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
87. 21 U.S. 543 (1823).
88. 30 U.S. 1 (1831).
89. 31 U.S. 515 (1832).
90. In Johnson, the Court integrated the doctrine of discovery into federal Indian policy. Under
this doctrine, ultimate title to land is vested in the United States government; Indian inhabitants “are
to be considered merely as occupants, to be protected . . . in the possession of their lands, but to be
deemed incapable of transferring the absolute title to others.” 21 U.S. at 591. Cherokee Nation and
Worcester established the notion that states generally have no power over Indian affairs, and that the
federal-tribal relationship is one of a trustee and beneficiary; because tribes are “domestic dependent
nations,” the United States has the authority to manage tribal property and the corresponding duty to
protect tribal interests. See Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 17 (discussing the status of tribes as
domestic dependent nations); Worcester, 31 U.S. at 520 (noting that the Cherokee Nation is under
the protection of the federal government, but remains “a distinct community occupying its own
territory, with boundaries accurately described, in which the laws of Georgia can have no
force . . . [t]he whole intercourse between the United States and [the Cherokee] nation, is, by our
constitution and laws, vested in the government of the United States”).
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relationship, has defined federal Indian policy since the early years of
the United States and continues to affect federal-tribal relations.91
B.

The Indian Law Canons of Construction Reflect Key Concepts
Inherent in the Federal-Tribal Trust Relationship, and Federal
Courts Apply the Canons in Construing Laws Affecting Indians

Federal courts use a set of rules known as the Indian law canons of
construction to construe statutes and treaties broadly in favor of
protecting tribal property and sovereignty, thus upholding the basic
concepts underlying the federal-tribal trust relationship.92 The Supreme
Court has noted that “the standard principles of statutory construction do
not have their usual force in cases involving Indian law.”93 Courts use
four canons of construction when construing laws concerning Indian
tribes or individual Indians.94 These rules establish that (1) treaties,
agreements, statutes, and executive orders must be liberally construed in
favor of the Indians; (2) ambiguities are to be resolved in favor of the
Indians; (3) treaties and agreements are to be construed as the Indians
would have understood them; and (4) tribal property rights and
sovereignty are to be upheld unless Congress shows clear and
unambiguous intent to the contrary.95 The Indian law canons of
construction reflect the idea that “tribes are not simply minority ethnic
groups, but are sovereigns possessing a government-to-government
relationship with the United States.”96 Thus, by requiring courts to
interpret treaties and statutes in favor of Indians, the canons ensure that
the federal government’s duty to protect tribal sovereignty and property,
stemming from the special government-to-government relationship
between tribes and the United States, remains intact.

91. See COHEN, supra note 15, § 5.04[4] (describing the federal trust relationship from past to
present).
92. See id. § 2.02[2], at 123.
93. Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe, 471 U.S. 759, 766 (1985). See also County of Oneida v. Oneida
Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226, 247 (1985) (“The canons of construction applicable in Indian law are
rooted in the unique trust relationship between the United States and the Indians.”).
94. See COHEN, supra note 15, § 2.02[1] (describing the development of the Indian law canons of
construction in the context of treaty interpretation).
95. See id. at 119–20.
96. Id. § 2.02[2], at 122–23.
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III. FEDERAL RECOGNITION OF TRIBES VARIED
THROUGHOUT HISTORY, CULMINATING IN THE IRA’S
FORMAL LIST OF “RECOGNIZED” TRIBES
The process by which the federal government recognizes Indian tribes
remains complex and ever-evolving. At its most basic level, recognition
formalizes the federal-tribal trust relationship and provides a basis for
tribes to receive benefits conferred by federal legislation.97 The federal
government has used various forms of recognition throughout the history
of federal-tribal relations, all of which acknowledge some historical
relationship between a tribe and the government.98 In 1934, upon
enactment of the IRA, the federal government compiled a list of
recognized tribes eligible for the IRA’s benefits.99 This Part will explore
the process of federal recognition before and after the IRA and will
demonstrate that the IRA list of recognized tribes excluded hundreds of
eligible Indian groups.
A.

Several Traditional Means of Recognition Predated the Enactment
of the IRA

The process of federal recognition or acknowledgment confirms a
tribe’s existence as a distinct political entity and formalizes the
government-to-government relationship between the tribe and the United
States.100 Traditionally, the term “Indian tribe” referred to an indigenous
North American group with which the United States had established a
legal relationship.101 At the most basic level, recognition required the
government to find that an Indian group had preserved its tribal
organization and was recognized by the political department of the
government as existing, thus proving itself to be a “people distinct from
others.”102 Before 1934, recognition also required proof of some
97. See generally COHEN, supra note 15, § 3.02[3] (describing the meaning and significance of
federal recognition).
98. See generally id. § 3.02[4]–[5] (describing the federal power to recognize tribes and the
historical establishment of federal-tribal relations through congressional acts, treaties, and executive
orders).
99. See William W. Quinn, Jr., Federal Acknowledgment of American Indian Tribes: The
Historical Development of a Legal Concept, 34 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 331, 356 (1990); see also
THEODORE H. HAAS, TEN YEARS OF TRIBAL GOVERNMENT UNDER THE I.R.A. 13–20 (U.S. Indian
Serv. 1947) (listing the tribes “which voted to accept or reject the terms” of the IRA).
100. See COHEN, supra note 15, § 3.02[3], at 138.
101. Id. § 3.01, at 135.
102. See The Kansas Indians, 72 U.S. 737, 755 (1866). This case concerned Kansas’s right to tax
lands in the state held in severalty by individual Indians of the Shawnee, Wea, and Miami tribes
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historical relationship with the federal government; the government
recognized tribes by treaty, statute, administrative process, or other
formal political action recognizing tribal existence.103 Additionally,
Congress had the power to directly confer recognition status upon
“distinctly Indian communities” that were historically unrecognized,104
an action that is sometimes still used—upon petition by Indian
communities—to correct historical mistakes or oversights.105 The
executive branch also had the power to “undertake diplomatic and
administrative actions consistent with federal recognition.”106 Courts
have generally deferred to executive and other governmental department
decisions to regard a tribe as recognized.107
The federal government also traditionally recognized tribes under
specific statutes. For the purposes of federal statutes, a group was treated
as a recognized tribe (and thus included within the statute’s coverage) if
Congress or the executive had created a reservation for the group by
treaty, agreement, statute, executive order, or valid administrative action,
and the United States had some continuing political relationship with the
group.108 In some cases, tribes qualified under federal statutes even if
they lacked formal federal recognition,109 but such qualification does not
provide the same broad benefits formally recognized tribes enjoy.110
under patents issued to them pursuant to treaties made between the United States and the tribes. As
for the Shawnees, the Court held that the state could not tax the land: “If the tribal organization of
the Shawnees is preserved intact, and recognized by the political department of the government as
existing, then they are a ‘people distinct from others,’ capable of making treaties, separated from the
jurisdiction of Kansas, and to be governed exclusively by the government of the Union.” Id.
103. See COHEN, supra note 15, § 3.02[3], at 138.
104. See United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28, 45–46 (1913) (noting that tribes may be
subjected to federal guardianship as dependent wards and that the United States has “the power and
the duty of exercising a fostering care and protection over all dependent Indian communities within
its borders”). When the federal government has regarded Indian groups as “dependent communities
entitled to its aid and protection, like other Indian tribes, and, considering their Indian lineage,
isolated and communal life, primitive customs and limited civilization, this assertion of
guardianship over them . . . must be regarded as both authorized and controlling.” Id. at 47.
105. See COHEN, supra note 15, § 3.02[5], at 144.
106. Id. § 3.02[4], at 140.
107. See United States v. Holliday, 70 U.S. 407, 419 (1865) (“[With respect to tribal recognition],
it is the rule of this court to follow the action of the executive and other political departments of the
government, whose more special duty it is to determine such affairs.”).
108. See COHEN, supra note 15, § 3.02[6][a], at 144.
109. For example, in Montoya v. United States, the Court held that an Indian tribe is a “tribe”
within the meaning of the Indian Depredation Act of 1891 if it is “a body of Indians of the same or a
similar race, united in a community under one leadership or government, and inhabiting a particular
though sometimes ill-defined territory.” 180 U.S. 261, 266 (1901). The Montoya definition has
since been used in determining which groups are included when Congress makes reference simply
to “tribes” in statutes. ANDERSON, supra note 56, at 253. For example, in United States v.
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The IRA of 1934 Draws from Trust Relationship Principles in Its
Treatment of Indian Property Rights and Sets Forth a Recognition
Requirement for Tribes Seeking to Benefit from Its Provisions

Congress enacted the IRA during the Indian New Deal, a period of
increasing concern over the failure of the federal policy of allotment of
Indian lands.111 Under the allotment policy, Congress opened Indian
lands to settlement, with individual allotments provided to Indians and
white settlers alike.112 The 1928 Meriam Report, a detailed study of
federal Indian policy, described the problems of the allotment era:
massive loss of tribal land and corresponding poverty, culture loss,
disruption of tribal governments, and reliance on the federal government
for basic survival needs.113 In response,114 Congress passed the IRA of
1934.115
Candelaria, the Court used the Montoya definition to conclude that the Pueblos of New Mexico
were a tribe within the meaning of the Nonintercourse Act, finding that “[the Pueblos] are Indians in
race, customs, and domestic government, always have lived in isolated communities, and are a
simple, uninformed people, ill-prepared to cope with the intelligence and greed of other races.” 271
U.S. 432, 441–42 (1926). Similarly, in Joint Tribal Council of the Passamaquoddy Tribe v. Morton,
the First Circuit held that the Passamaquoddy tribe could assert rights under the Nonintercourse Act
even though it had never signed a treaty or entered into a political relationship with the United
States. 528 F.2d 370, 379 (1st Cir. 1975) (“We agree with the district court that the words ‘any tribe
of Indians’ appearing in the Act include the Passamaquoddy Tribe.”). The court found that there is
“nothing in the [Nonintercourse] Act to suggest that ‘tribe’ is to be read to exclude a bona fide tribe
not otherwise federally recognized.” Id. at 377. Moreover, “there is no evidence that the absence of
federal dealings was or is based on doubts as to the genuineness of the Passamaquoddies’ tribal
status, apart, that is, from the simple lack of recognition.” Id. at 378.
110. See COHEN, supra note 15, § 3.02[6][a], at 145 (noting that specific recognition is not the
same as broad, general recognition because “[t]he legal principles developed under one statutory
scheme often cannot be transferred to other situations because of the peculiar context in which the
original principles were developed”).
111. See id. § 1.05 (describing the motivations and history behind enactment of the IRA).
112. See id. § 1.04 (describing allotment and its effects on Indian land and culture).
113. THE PROBLEM OF INDIAN ADMINISTRATION 3–8 (Lewis Meriam ed., Johns Hopkins Press
1928) [hereinafter Meriam Report] (setting forth the report’s findings concerning living conditions,
economic and social problems, poverty, and loss of land and culture among Indian tribes).
114. See 78 CONG. REC. 11,123 (1934) (statement of Sen. Wheeler) (noting that a prime
motivation behind introduction of the IRA in Congress was that “while the Government has been
seeking to train the Indians of the United States, as a matter of fact most of them are in a much more
deplorable condition economically than they ever have been . . . . In many instances they have lost
their land . . . . We have pauperized them . . . .”); see also John Collier, extract from the Annual
Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs 78–83 (1934), reprinted in DOCUMENTS OF UNITED
STATES INDIAN POLICY 225–29 (Francis Paul Prucha ed., 3d ed., Univ. Neb. Press 2000)
(describing the consequences of allotment and detailing Congress’s intent, as set forth in the
Wheeler-Howard Act (IRA), to remedy the loss of Indian land and culture).
115. Wheeler-Howard (Indian Reorganization) Act, Pub. L. No. 73-383, 48 Stat. 984, 985 (1934)
(codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 465 (2006)).
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Congress enacted the IRA with the federal-tribal trust relationship in
mind.116 Major IRA goals included ending the alienation of tribal land,
facilitating tribal acquisition of additional land, protecting tribal land
from future encroachment, and assisting tribes in establishing legal
structures for self-government.117 In support of these goals, various
provisions of the IRA ended the practice of allotment of Indian
reservation lands,118 authorized the Secretary of the Interior to proclaim
new reservations or add to existing reservation lands,119 and established
a procedure for tribes to organize and adopt constitutions and bylaws.120
Importantly, Section 5 of the IRA provided that
[t]he Secretary of the Interior is hereby authorized, in his
discretion, to acquire, through purchase, relinquishment, gift,
exchange, or assignment, any interest in lands, water rights or
surface rights to lands, within or without existing reservations,
including trust or otherwise restricted allotments . . . for the
purpose of providing land for Indians.121
The United States holds lands acquired under Section 5 in trust for the
benefit of Indians and Indian tribes, and the lands are not subject to state
or local taxation.122
Because the IRA specifically authorizes the Secretary to take land
into trust for “Indians,”123 a major issue involves the determination of
who qualifies as an Indian under the IRA’s trust-land provisions. The
IRA defines “Indian” as

116. See DOCUMENTS OF UNITED STATES INDIAN POLICY, supra note 114, at 226 (describing the
duty of the federal government to undo the damage created by allotment and the intent of Congress
to facilitate the “economic and the spiritual rehabilitation of the Indian race”).
117. See 78 CONG. REC. 11,123 (1934) (statement of Sen. Wheeler) (outlining the purposes and
goals of the IRA); see also COHEN, supra note 15, § 1.05, at 86 (describing the federal objectives
underlying passage of the IRA).
118. Indian Reorganization Act § 1 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 461).
119. Id. § 7 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 467).
120. Id. § 16 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 476).
121. Id. § 5 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 465). Despite the fact that the Secretary has taken land into
trust for various tribes since passage of the IRA in 1934, the Department of the Interior did not
adopt specific criteria for deciding when to accept property into trust until 1980. See Land
Acquisitions, 45 Fed. Reg. 62,034–37 (Sept. 18, 1980) (codified at 25 C.F.R. pt. 151 (2009)). Under
these regulations, the Secretary may take land into trust for a tribe if a statute authorizes such an
action, provided that the “property is located within the exterior boundaries of the tribe’s reservation
or adjacent thereto,” the tribe “already owns an interest in the land,” or “the Secretary determines
that the acquisition of the land is necessary to facilitate tribal self-determination, economic
development, or Indian housing.” 25 C.F.R. § 151.3(a) (2009).
122. Indian Reorganization Act § 5 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 465).
123. Id.
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all persons of Indian descent who are members of any
recognized Indian tribe now under Federal jurisdiction, and all
persons who are descendants of such members who were, on
June 1, 1934, residing within the present boundaries of any
Indian reservation, and shall further include all other persons of
one-half or more Indian blood.124
Thus, in determining which tribes may claim the benefits conferred by
Section 5 of the IRA, federal recognition of tribes and federal
jurisdiction over such tribes are important considerations.
Congress amended the IRA in 1994 to reflect the notion that the
federal government should treat all recognized tribes equally.125 The
1994 amendment provides that
Departments or agencies of the United States shall not
promulgate any regulation or make any decision or
determination pursuant to [the IRA of 1934] as amended, or any
other Act of Congress, with respect to a federally recognized
Indian tribe that classifies, enhances, or diminishes the
privileges and immunities available to the Indian tribe relative to
other federally recognized tribes by virtue of their status as
Indian tribes.126
Through the amendment, Congress expressed its desire to treat
recognized tribes equally with regard to federal benefits, “[w]hatever the
method by which recognition was extended.”127 The congressional intent
behind the 1994 amendment emphasizes that “Indian tribes recognized
by the Federal Government stand on an equal footing to each other and
to the Federal Government, and that each federally recognized Indian
tribe is entitled to the same privileges and immunities as other federally
recognized tribes.”128

124. Id. § 19 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 479) (emphasis added).
125. The Congressional Record for the 1994 IRA amendments supports the idea that “[t]he
purpose of the amendment is to clarify that section 16 of the Indian Reorganization Act was not
intended to authorize the Secretary of the Department of the Interior to create categories of federally
recognized Indian tribes . . . . The recognition of an Indian tribe by the Federal Government is an
acknowledgement that the Indian tribe is a sovereign entity with governmental authority which
predates the U.S. Constitution . . . . Whatever the method by which recognition was extended, all
Indian tribes enjoy the same relationship with the United States and exercise the same inherent
authority.” See 140 CONG. REC. 11,376, 11,377 (May 23, 1994) (statement of Rep. Richardson).
126. Act of May 31, 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-263, § 5(b), 108 Stat. 707, 709 (codified at 25 U.S.C.
§ 476(f) (2006)).
127. See 140 CONG. REC. 11,376, 11,377 (May 23, 1994) (statement of Rep. Richardson).
128. Id.
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C.

The Government’s First Attempt to Officially Recognize Tribes
Was a 1934 List that Coupled Recognition with Federal
Jurisdiction and Excluded Hundreds of Eligible Tribes

There is no specific date upon which the United States decided to
formally recognize tribes. Instead, the history of recognition shows
“consistent uncertainty and even confusion on the part of the several
branches of the government of the United States.”129 Until the IRA, no
express congressional declaration or statement clarified which tribes
were or were not recognized by the federal government.130
In the early years of federal-tribal relations, the idea of federal
recognition of Indian tribes remained vague and undefined.131 Beginning
around the 1870s, the term “recognition” came to be used in a formal
jurisdictional sense, meaning that the federal government acknowledged
a tribe as a domestic dependent nation and dealt with it in a special
government-to-government relationship.132 Although Congress ended
the practice of making treaties with Indian tribes in a rider to the Indian
Appropriation Act of 1871,133 the federal government continued to
recognize tribes by other means, including congressional agreements,
legislation, and executive action.134 Recognition proceeded on an ad hoc
basis, as the BIA had no coherent policy for deciding which tribes
deserved recognition and which did not. 135
The federal government finally compiled an official list of recognized
tribes in 1934, when passage of the IRA necessitated a determination of
which tribes would qualify for reorganization under the IRA’s
provisions.136 Commissioner of Indian Affairs John Collier undertook
the task of determining “which Indian groups were or should be
129. Quinn, supra note 99, at 332.
130. See id.
131. See id. at 333 (noting that in the early documentary record, “recognition” simply meant that
federal officials knew or realized that a tribe existed as an entity).
132. See id.
133. Act of Mar. 3, 1871, ch. 120, §1, 16 Stat. 544, 566 (codified in part at 25 U.S.C. § 71
(2006)) (providing that from that date forward “no Indian nation or tribe within the territory of the
United States shall be acknowledged or recognized as an independent nation, tribe, or power with
whom the United States may contract by treaty”).
134. See COHEN, supra note 15, § 3.02[4], at 141; ANDERSON, supra note 56, at 89.
135. See Quinn, supra note 99, at 352–53 (describing the federal government’s slow progress in
coming to terms with the concept of federal recognition of tribes); see also ANDERSON, supra note
56, at 248 (noting that “[t]he decision to recognize a group as a tribe at all might also be an accident
of history.”).
136. See Quinn, supra note 99, at 356; see also HAAS, supra note 99, at 1–2 (describing the
general process of tribal reorganization under the IRA).
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recognized by the federal government and permitted to organize and
vote on application of the Act.”137 The original IRA required the
Secretary of the Interior to call tribal elections for all IRA-eligible tribes
within one year of its passage, with the eligible tribes permitted to
choose whether or not to reorganize under the IRA.138 Collier thus had a
very short time to determine which tribes qualified to reorganize under
the IRA, and despite a 1935 amendment to the IRA that extended this
period for another year,139 much of the work of studying and selecting
tribes for purposes of the IRA was “done in haste.”140
Collier ultimately compiled a list of 258 recognized tribes eligible to
vote to reorganize under the IRA.141 These tribes, as well as tribes
recognized after 1934, have been allowed to have land held in trust
under Section 5.142 From the beginning of the IRA’s implementation, the
government coupled recognition with federal jurisdiction;143 tribes have
not had to prove jurisdiction as an element separate from recognition
every time they apply to have land taken into trust.144
By creating a list, the government distinguished between recognized
and unrecognized tribes for purposes of the IRA, but due to the haste
with which Commissioner Collier determined tribal eligibility, several
potentially eligible tribes were overlooked and excluded.145 This created
137. See Brief of Law Professors Specializing in Federal Indian Law as Amicus Curiae
Supporting Respondents at 22, Carcieri v. Salazar, 555 U.S. __ (Feb. 24, 2009), 129 S. Ct. 1058
(2009) (No. 07-526), 2008 WL 3991411, at *22.
138. Wheeler-Howard (Indian Reorganization) Act, Pub. L. No. 73-383, § 18, 48 Stat. 984, 988
(1934) (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 478 (2006)).
139. See Act of June 15, 1935, ch. 260, § 2, 49 Stat. 378.
140. See William H. Kelly, Indian Adjustment and the History of Indian Affairs, 10 ARIZ. L. REV.
559, 569 (1968).
141. See Quinn, supra note 99, at 356. For the list of tribes Collier determined to be eligible to
vote on application of the IRA, see HAAS, supra note 99, at 13–20.
142. See COHEN, supra note 15, § 15.07[1][a], at 1009–10 (describing the trust-land provisions of
the IRA as applying to all Indian tribes, regardless of when they were recognized); see also infra
Part IV (providing examples of tribes recognized after 1934 that have had land held in trust under
the IRA).
143. A search of the leading treatise, cases, and articles on the subject failed to reveal any case
before 2009 where federal jurisdiction was considered separately from recognition for purposes of
the IRA’s trust-land provisions. See id. at 1010 (“The IRA applies to all Indian tribes, whether
recognized in 1934, or subsequently acknowledged by Congress or the executive.”).
144. See id. (describing the trust-land provisions of the IRA; until 2009, the provisions applied to
all Indian tribes, regardless of date of recognition). This policy, which did not require recognized
tribes to show separate evidence of federal jurisdiction in 1934 to qualify for benefits under the
IRA, prevailed until the Carcieri decision. See infra Part V (describing Carcieri and its effects on
tribes seeking to qualify for the IRA’s trust-land provisions).
145. See infra Part IV (providing examples of excluded tribes that have nevertheless achieved
recognition since 1934).
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a need for procedures by which tribes unrecognized in 1934 could
achieve federal recognition146—a status that increased in importance
after the termination era of federal Indian policy.147
The original IRA list included 258 tribes but excluded many more, as
evidenced by the fact that the federal government has since recognized
an additional 306 tribes for a total of 564 federally recognized tribes.148
Government studies of Indian groups in the 1930s “were often quite
limited and inaccurate,”149 and some groups now known to have existed
as tribes in 1934 were mistakenly portrayed by the federal government at
the time as not having maintained stable communities or political
leadership.150 Many of the mistakes made during the compilation of the
1934 list concerned landless tribes, as the IRA referred only to tribes
residing on reservations.151 The IRA list also excluded small tribes,
tribes that had never had significant dealings with the United States,
peaceful tribes that had never fought against the United States, and
branches of tribes whose principal nations had already achieved
recognition, but who sought independent tribal status.152 Additionally, in
the late 1970s, an American Indian Policy Review Commission study of
Indian tribe recognition concluded that in compiling the 1934 list, the
government failed to recognize dozens of tribes simply “because of
bureaucratic oversight.”153 These inadequacies complicate the task of

146. See Quinn, supra note 99, at 357.
147. See generally COHEN, supra note 15, § 1.06[4], at 89–97 (describing the termination era and
its effects on Indian tribes, including the end of the federal-tribal relationship and the
discontinuation of federal benefits upon termination of tribal status).
148. All of these tribes can demonstrate continuously existing communities, historical existence
as American Indian entities, and/or various historical relationships with the United States. See supra
Part III.A (describing traditional methods of recognition); see also infra Part IV.B (describing the
modern 25 C.F.R. Part 83 recognition process); Indian Entities Recognized and Eligible to Receive
Services from the United States Bureau of Indian Affairs, 74 Fed. Reg. 40,218 (Aug. 11, 2009)
(listing the 564 tribes recognized as of August 2009).
149. See Procedures for Establishing that an American Indian Group Exists as an Indian Tribe, 59
Fed. Reg. 9280, 9281 (Feb. 25, 1994).
150. Id.
151. See Brief of Law Professors, supra note 137, at 22–24, 2008 WL 3991411, at *22–24
(describing the exclusion of landless tribes from the IRA list).
152. See Mark D. Myers, Federal Recognition of Indian Tribes in the United States, 12 STAN. L.
& POL’Y REV. 271, 274–75 (2001).
153. AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY REVIEW COMMISSION, FINAL REPORT 8 (1977). The
Commission noted that “[t]rying to find a pattern for the administrative determination of a federally
recognized Indian tribe is an exercise in futility . . . . The [recognition procedure] was subject to an
accident of history.” Id. at 462; see also Brief of Law Professors, supra note 137, at 25, 2008 WL
3991411, at *25 (describing the Commission’s study).
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determining which modern tribes qualify as recognized for purposes of
the IRA.
IV. THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT RECOGNIZED TRIBES BY
TRADITIONAL MEANS UNTIL ESTABLISHING A FORMAL
RECOGNITION PROCESS IN 1978
Despite the government’s mistakes and oversights in compiling the
original IRA list of recognized tribes, tribes excluded from that list have
obtained federal recognition through traditional methods since 1934.154
Additionally, in 1978, several decades after enactment of the IRA, the
federal government established a formal administrative recognition
process (codified as amended at 25 C.F.R. Part 83).155 Since 1978, the
federal government has recognized sixteen tribes through its formal
administrative process.156 This Part will demonstrate that tribes
recognized under both traditional and 25 C.F.R. Part 83 processes have
had land held in trust under the IRA’s trust-land provisions.
A.

Between 1934 and 1978, Tribes that Were Not Included in the IRA
List Achieved Traditional Federal Recognition and Had Land Held
in Trust by the Government

Because the IRA did not establish a formal mechanism for
recognizing Indian tribes, the government continued to use traditional
recognition procedures after the IRA’s enactment.157 Between 1934 and
1978, tribes excluded from the IRA list achieved recognition through
those procedures, under which the government acknowledges
preexisting historical relationships with particular tribes.158 For example,
the federal government recognized the Nooksack tribe of Washington in
1971159 based on the tribe’s long-standing treaty rights under the Point
154. See supra Part III.A for a description of traditional methods of recognition. The original IRA
recognized 258 tribes and currently there are 564 recognized tribes, meaning the government has
recognized 306 tribes by various means since enactment of the IRA. For the current list of
recognized tribes, see Indian Entities Recognized and Eligible to Receive Services from the United
States Bureau of Indian Affairs, 74 Fed. Reg. 40,218 (Aug. 11, 2009).
155. See 25 C.F.R. pt. 83 (2009); see also COHEN, supra note 15, § 3.02[7][a], at 155–59
(describing the 1978 promulgation of regulations governing federal recognition under 25 C.F.R.
Part 83 and detailing the Part 83 process).
156. See Brief of Law Professors, supra note 137, at app. 3, 2008 WL 3991411, at app. 3 (listing
the tribes recognized under 25 C.F.R. Part 83).
157. See supra Part III.A (describing traditional recognition methods).
158. See supra Part III.A.
159. See Brief of Law Professors, supra note 137, at app. 2, 2008 WL 3991411, at app. 2 (noting
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Elliott Treaty of 1855.160 Similarly, the Department of the Interior
recognized the Stillaguamish tribe of Washington in 1976, noting that
the tribe was “an Indian tribe entitled to exercise treaty fishing rights,
and that the Department has a trust responsibility with respect to the
protection of those rights.”161 The Department later concluded that the
Secretary of the Interior could take land into trust for the tribe.162
Congress, which “may elect to recognize a tribe as a means to correct
historical oversights from earlier legislation . . . or to accord similar
treatment for tribes similarly situated,”163 has also directly recognized
tribes.164 These examples demonstrate that the government does formally
recognize tribes excluded from the 1934 list and that the Department of
the Interior allows tribes recognized through traditional means after
1934 to take advantage of the IRA’s trust-land provisions.165

the recognition of the Nooksack Indian Tribe by a Department of the Interior Solicitor’s opinion
issued August 13, 1971).
160. See Barbara S. Lane, IDENTITY AND TREATY STATUS OF THE NOOKSACK INDIANS:
PREPARED FOR U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR AND THE NOOKSACK INDIAN TRIBE 21–22
(1974) (concluding that based on the evidence, the Nooksack Indian Tribe was a party to the Point
Elliott Treaty of 1855).
161. See Letter from Kent Frizzell, Acting Secretary of the Interior, to David H. Getches, Esquire,
Native American Rights Fund at 1 (Oct. 27, 1976) (on file with author).
162. See Memorandum from Associate Solicitor, Indian Affairs to Assistant Secretary, Indian
Affairs, Request for Reconsideration of Decision Not to Take Land in Trust for the Stillaguamish
Tribe (Oct. 1, 1980). The Associate Solicitor concluded that “the treaty fishing rights of the
Stillaguamish render them a ‘recognized tribe now under federal jurisdiction’” and that “[i]t is
irrelevant that the United States was ignorant in 1934 of the rights of the Stillaguamish and that no
clear determination or redetermination of the status of the tribe was made at that time.” Id. at 6–7.
After noting that the Stillaguamish “constitute a tribe for purposes of the IRA,” the Associate
Solicitor concluded that based on the tribe’s poverty, high rate of unemployment, and lack of land
base, “the Stillaguamish have adequately established their need for trust land and that the Secretary
has the authority and discretion to take land in trust for the tribe.” Id. at 8.
163. COHEN, supra note 15, § 3.02[5], at 144. For examples of tribes recognized since 1960 and
the various means by which recognition was conferred on those tribes, see U.S. GENERAL
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, INDIAN ISSUES: IMPROVEMENTS NEEDED IN TRIBAL RECOGNITION PROCESS
25–26 (2001).
164. See Brief of Law Professors, supra note 137, at app. 1, 2008 WL 3991411, at app. 1 (listing
tribes recognized by congressional legislation).
165. See id. at app. 1–2, 2008 WL 3991411, at app. 1–2 (listing tribes recognized through
congressional legislation and informal executive branch action since 1934); see also supra Part
IV.A and infra Part IV.B (noting instances in which land has been taken into trust for tribes
recognized after 1934).
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In 1978, the Federal Government Created the First Formal
Mechanism for Tribal Recognition

After years of ad hoc recognition and confusion regarding tribal
status, the Department of the Interior finally created a formal
administrative recognition process (codified as amended at 25 C.F.R.
Part 83) in 1978.166 As part of the implementation of the new recognition
procedures, the government in 1979 published a comprehensive list of
Indian tribes recognized by any means before that year.167 Any Indian
groups not included on the list are considered unrecognized and must
complete the formal administrative process of 25 C.F.R. Part 83, or in
extreme cases petition Congress,168 to obtain federal benefits.169
Detailed procedures for obtaining federal recognition of tribal status
are set forth in 25 C.F.R. Part 83.170 Tribes must meet seven mandatory
criteria for recognition, the most pertinent of which are identification as
an American Indian entity on a substantially continuous basis since 1900
and existence as a community from historical times until the present.171
The 25 C.F.R. Part 83 recognition process is long and cumbersome, but
since its enactment, sixteen tribes have succeeded in obtaining
recognition, including some that were excluded from the 1934 list of
recognized tribes.172 For example, in 1934 the Department assumed that
the Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa and Chippewa Indians had been
dissolved.173 However, in 1980 the Grand Traverse Band became the
166. See Procedures for Establishing that an American Indian Group Exists as an Indian Tribe, 43
Fed. Reg. 39,361 (Sept. 5, 1978) (codified as amended at 25 C.F.R. pt. 83 (2009)).
167. The 1979 list differs from the 1934 IRA list in that the 1979 list contains the tribes listed as
recognized under the IRA, as well as tribes recognized by traditional means between 1934 and
1979. See Indian Tribal Entities That Have a Government-to-Government Relationship with the
United States, 44 Fed. Reg. 7235 (Feb. 6, 1979).
168. See Brief of Law Professors, supra note 137, at app. 1, 2008 WL 3991411, at app. 1 (listing
tribes recognized by congressional legislation).
169. See id. at 6, 2008 WL 3991411, at *6; see also Indian Tribal Entities That Have a
Government-to-Government Relationship with the United States, 44 Fed. Reg. 7235 (Feb. 6, 1979)
(listing the tribes recognized by the federal government as of 1979); Indian Entities Recognized and
Eligible to Receive Services from the United States Bureau of Indian Affairs, 74 Fed. Reg. 40,218
(Aug. 11, 2009) (listing the 564 tribes recognized by the federal government as of August 2009).
170. See COHEN, supra note 15, § 3.02[7][a], at 155–59 (describing the 25 C.F.R. Part 83
process).
171. See 25 C.F.R. § 83.7 (2009).
172. See Brief of Law Professors, supra note 137, at 30, 2008 WL 3991411, at *30 (noting the
use of 25 C.F.R. Part 83 to grant recognition to sixteen tribes since 1978); id. at app. 3, 2008 WL
3991411, at app. 3 (listing the sixteen tribes).
173. In the 1870s, the Secretary of the Interior misinterpreted the 1855 Ottawa Chippewa Treaty
to provide for dissolution of the tribes. This led the Secretary to terminate relations with the tribe,
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first tribe formally recognized under the new recognition procedures.174
In making its decision to recognize the tribe, the Department determined
that its previous position was mistaken and that the tribe had in fact
existed continuously and autonomously since first contact with European
settlers.175 Since the 1980 recognition, the Department has taken
multiple parcels of land into trust for the tribe under the IRA.176
Similarly, the federal government recognized the Cowlitz tribe of
Washington throughout the 1800s,177 but changed its stance in the earlyto mid-1900s after concluding that the tribe had assimilated into U.S.
society.178 As a result, the tribe was excluded from the list of recognized
tribes compiled in 1934.179 The tribe petitioned the federal government
for recognition in 1975 and finally obtained recognition twenty-five
years later, with the Department concluding that the tribe could “trace an
unbroken line of leaders and a relatively unchanging membership” since
1870, thus establishing that the tribe had maintained its governmental
structure and organization.180 Thus, as it has with traditional methods of
recognition, the federal government has recognized tribes under 25
C.F.R. Part 83 and has allowed those tribes to take advantage of the
IRA’s trust-land provisions.

and the federal government proceeded to withdraw all government services. The tribe remained
unrecognized in 1934 when the IRA was enacted. See id. at 33–34, 2008 WL 3991411, at *33–34.
174. See id. at 34–35, 2008 WL 3991411, at *34–35.
175. The Department of the Interior found that the tribe was “unquestionably Indian” and that
“[n]o evidence was found that the members of the band [were] members of any other Indian tribes,
or that the band or its members [were] terminated or forbidden the Federal relationship by an Act of
Congress.” See Determination for Federal Acknowledgment of the Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa
and Chippewa Indians as an Indian Tribe, 45 Fed. Reg. 19,321 (Mar. 25, 1980).
176. See Grand Traverse Band of Chippewa and Ottawa Indians Establishment of Reservation, 49
Fed. Reg. 2025, 2026 (Jan. 17, 1984) (designating a 12.5-acre parcel of land as reservation land for
the tribe’s exclusive use); see also Grand Traverse Band v. United States, 198 F. Supp. 2d 920, 925
(W.D. Mich. 2002) (noting that between March 1988 and July 1990, “[t]he United States took into
trust multiple parcels of property that continue to constitute the majority of [the Grand Traverse
Band’s] trust lands”).
177. See Brief of Law Professors, supra note 137, at 31, 2008 WL 3991411, at *31.
178. See id. (noting that in the early twentieth century, settlers flooded into the area formerly
occupied by the Cowlitz Indians and the Cowlitz lost many of their aboriginal lands, which
contributed to the government’s view that the tribe had been dissolved).
179. See id. at 32, 2008 WL 3991411, at *32.
180. See Final Determination to Acknowledge the Cowlitz Indian Tribe, 65 Fed. Reg. 8436, 8437
(Feb. 18, 2000); see also Brief of Law Professors, supra note 137, at 32–33, 2008 WL 3991411, at
*32–33 (describing the tribe’s long-fought battle for recognition).
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IN CARCIERI V. SALAZAR, THE SUPREME COURT
DECOUPLED FEDERAL JURISDICTION FROM FEDERAL
RECOGNITION FOR PURPOSES OF THE IRA

Since 1934, the Department of the Interior has recognized tribes
excluded from the 1934 IRA list and has allowed those tribes to take
advantage of the trust-land provisions of Section 5 of the IRA.181
However, in Carcieri v. Salazar, the Supreme Court threw this practice
into doubt when it held that one such tribe, the Narragansett,182 did not
qualify to have land held in trust by the federal government under
Section 5 of the IRA. This Part examines the case along with the Court’s
decision and its implications.
A.

The Secretary of the Interior, a Federal District Court, and the
Court of Appeals Found that the Narragansett Tribe, a Recognized
Tribe Under 25 C.F.R. Part 83, Qualified for IRA Benefits

The Narragansett tribe, an indigenous occupant of Rhode Island, has
existed autonomously since its first contact with European settlers.183 In
1709, the Colony of Rhode Island established guardianship over the
tribe; this idea of guardianship passed to the state of Rhode Island upon
statehood.184 In 1880, Rhode Island began a “detribalization” program
under which the Narragansett tribe relinquished all tribal authority and
gave up all but two acres of its territory.185 The tribe regretted this
decision and immediately petitioned the federal government seeking
support in regaining the tribe’s land and status; however, the federal
government denied aid, claiming that the tribe had always been staterecognized, not federally recognized.186
In the late 1970s, the tribe filed suit against Rhode Island in an
attempt to recover its aboriginal title, claiming that the state had
misappropriated the tribe’s territory in violation of the Indian
181. See supra Part IV (providing examples of recent federal recognition of tribes excluded from
the IRA’s 1934 list and subsequent decisions by the Department of the Interior to hold land in trust
for such tribes under Section 5 of the IRA).
182. Since being recognized in 1983, the tribe has had 1,800 acres of land successfully taken into
trust under the IRA. See Carcieri v. Salazar, 555 U.S. __ (Feb. 24, 2009), 129 S. Ct. 1058, 1062
(2009).
183. Final Determination for Federal Acknowledgment of Narragansett Indian Tribe of Rhode
Island, 48 Fed. Reg. 6177, 6178 (Feb. 10, 1983).
184. See id.
185. Id. See also Carcieri, 555 U.S. at __, 129 S. Ct. at 1061 (describing Rhode Island’s efforts to
assimilate the tribe).
186. See Carcieri, 555 U.S. at __, 129 S. Ct. at 1061.
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Nonintercourse Act.187 The parties settled with the passage of the federal
Rhode Island Indian Claims Settlement Act (“Settlement Act”)188 in
1978 and the state Narragansett Indian Land Management Corporation
Act189 in 1979. The Settlement Act extinguished the tribe’s aboriginal
title to certain lands,190 and in return the tribe received title to 1800 acres
of settlement lands in Charlestown, Rhode Island,191 over which the state
exercised criminal and civil jurisdiction.192
The Narragansett tribe obtained federal recognition through the 25
C.F.R. Part 83 process in 1983,193 with the government finding that “the
Narragansett community and its predecessors have existed
autonomously since first contact . . . . The tribe has a documented
history dating from 1614.”194 Shortly thereafter, the tribe urged the
Secretary of the Interior to accept a deed of trust to the 1800 acres
granted to the tribe in the Settlement Act.195 The Secretary acquiesced,
and in 1988 the government formally took the land into trust for the
tribe.196 In 1991, the tribe purchased another thirty-one acres of land in
Charlestown adjacent to the 1800 acres of settlement lands.197 The tribe
requested that the Secretary take the thirty-one-acre parcel into trust,198
and in 1998 the BIA notified the tribe of its decision to do so.199

187. See id. at __, 129 S. Ct. at 1061–62.
188. See Rhode Island Indian Claims Settlement Act, Pub. L. No. 95-395, 92 Stat. 813 (effective
Sept. 30, 1978) (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 1701–1716 (2006)).
189. The Narragansett Indian Land Management Corporation Act is codified as amended at R.I.
GEN. LAWS §§ 37-18-1 to -15 (1997 & Supp. 2009).
190. See 25 U.S.C. § 1705(a)(2)–(3) (extinguishing all future claims by the Narragansetts to
aboriginal title).
191. See 25 U.S.C. § 1707 (providing for purchase and transfer of the settlement lands to the
tribe).
192. See 25 U.S.C. § 1708(a).
193. See Final Determination for Federal Acknowledgment of Narragansett Indian Tribe of
Rhode Island, 48 Fed. Reg. 6177 (Feb. 10, 1983).
194. Id. at 6178.
195. See Carcieri v. Salazar, 555 U.S. __ (Feb. 24, 2009), 129 S. Ct. 1058, 1062 (2009).
196. See id. at __, 129 S. Ct. at 1062.
197. See id.
198. See id. The tribe wished to construct housing on the thirty-one acre parcel, and by having the
land held in trust by the federal government, the tribe would avoid compliance with local zoning
regulations. Id.
199. See Letter from Franklin Keel, Eastern Area Director, BIA, to Matthew Thomas, Chief
Sachem, Narragansett Indian Tribe (Mar. 6, 1998), reprinted in Petition for Writ of Certiorari Joint
Appendix at 45a, Carcieri v. Salazar, 555 U.S. __ (Feb. 24, 2009), 129 S. Ct. 1058 (2009) (No. 07526) (noting that “it has been determined to be in the best interest of the Tribe that the subject
property be accepted into trust”).
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The Town of Charlestown appealed the Secretary’s decision to the
Interior Board of Indian Appeals (IBIA), which upheld the decision to
take the land into trust.200 The town and the governor of Rhode Island
then challenged the IBIA decision in federal district court, arguing, inter
alia, that the phrase “members of any recognized Indian tribe now under
Federal jurisdiction”201 restricts the Secretary’s IRA trust authority to
acquisitions made on behalf of tribes that were federally recognized as
of the time of the IRA’s enactment in June 1934.202 The district court
ruled for the Secretary, finding that tribes did not have to be recognized
in 1934 to have land held in trust under Section 5 of the IRA.203 In so
finding, the district court concluded that because the Narragansett tribe
is currently federally recognized, and because the tribe existed in 1934, it
“qualifies as an ‘Indian tribe’ within the meaning of [the IRA]”204 and
thus the Secretary has the authority under the IRA to accept lands into
trust for the tribe.205 The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
affirmed,206 finding that Congress used the word “now” ambiguously in
Section 19 of the IRA (defining “Indian” as “persons of Indian descent
who are members of any recognized Indian tribe now under Federal
jurisdiction”)207 and that “the Secretary’s construction of [IRA Section
19] as allowing trust acquisitions for tribes that are recognized and under

200. See Town of Charlestown, 35 I.B.I.A. 93 (2000). The town challenged the constitutionality
of 24 U.S.C. § 465, claiming that acquisition of land in trust without the consent of the state is
unconstitutional. Id. at 96. The town also challenged the authority of the Secretary to take into trust
lands other than the 1800 acres authorized by the Settlement Act. Id. at 97. The IBIA rejected both
arguments, finding that the IBIA had no jurisdiction over the claims of unconstitutionality and
finding that Congress did not intend in the Settlement Act to prohibit the Secretary from acquiring
lands other than the settlement lands in trust for the tribe. Id. at 97–101. The town’s other
arguments, based on the potential for Indian gaming on the trust lands, and compliance with the
Coastal Zone Management Act, were similarly struck down by the IBIA. Id. at 103–06.
201. Wheeler-Howard (Indian Reorganization) Act, Pub. L. No. 73-383, § 19, 48 Stat. 984, 988
(1934) (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 479 (2006)).
202. See Carcieri v. Norton, 290 F. Supp. 2d 167, 179 (D.R.I. 2003). The district court noted,
“[u]nder plaintiffs’ analysis, any tribe, including the Narragansetts, that was afforded federal
recognition subsequent to June 1934 does not qualify as an ‘Indian tribe’ pursuant to § 479.” Id.
203. See id. at 179.
204. Id. at 181.
205. Id.
206. The First Circuit affirmed first in a panel decision, Carcieri v. Norton, 423 F.3d 45, 71
(2005), and then in an en banc decision, Carcieri v. Kempthorne, 497 F.3d 15, 48 (1st Cir. 2007),
rev’d, 555 U.S. __ (Feb. 24, 2009), 129 S. Ct. 1058 (2009).
207. Wheeler-Howard (Indian Reorganization) Act, Pub. L. No. 73-383, § 19, 48 Stat. 984, 988
(1934) (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 479 (2006)) (emphasis added).
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federal jurisdiction at the time of the trust application is entitled to
deference.”208
B.

The Court Held the Secretary’s Trust Authority Under the IRA
Extends Only to Tribes Under Federal Jurisdiction in 1934 and the
Narragansett Tribe Did Not Prove Such Jurisdiction Existed

The Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed.209 The Court held
that the use of the phrase “now under federal jurisdiction” in the IRA
refers “solely to events contemporaneous with the Act’s enactment.”210
Thus, the IRA limits the Secretary’s trust authority under Section 5 to
“those tribes that were under the federal jurisdiction of the United States
when the IRA was enacted in 1934.”211 Although the jurisdiction issue
had not been litigated in the lower courts, the petition for certiorari and
the governor’s brief stated that the tribe was neither federally recognized
nor under federal jurisdiction when the IRA was enacted in 1934.212
Neither the tribe nor the Secretary argued that the tribe was under federal
jurisdiction in 1934 because the Secretary’s understanding had always
been that recognition and federal jurisdiction for purposes of the IRA
were “one and the same.”213 The Secretary’s brief instead focused on the
structure and purpose of the IRA and the statute’s ambiguous definition
of “Indian.”214
When Justice Souter raised the jurisdiction issue at oral arguments,
counsel for the Secretary argued that the case had not been litigated on
that issue and that it should be remanded to give the tribe a chance to
show federal jurisdiction.215 In its decision, however, the Court
construed the tribe’s and the Secretary’s failure to contest the governor’s
“no federal jurisdiction” assertion against the tribe and concluded that

208. Carcieri, 497 F.3d at 30. The court reached this conclusion by using a Chevron analysis,
asking first whether the statute was ambiguous and, upon so finding, asking whether the Secretary’s
interpretation was reasonable and permissible.
209. See Carcieri v. Salazar, 555 U.S. __ (Feb. 24, 2009), 129 S. Ct. 1058, 1063 (2009).
210. Id. at __, 129 S. Ct. at 1065.
211. Id. at __, 129 S. Ct. at 1068.
212. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 3, Carcieri, 555 U.S. __, 129 S. Ct. 1058 (No. 07-526);
Brief for Petitioner Donald L. Carcieri at 15, Carcieri, 555 U.S. __, 129 S. Ct. 1058 (No. 07-526).
213. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 42, Carcieri, 555 U.S. __, 129 S. Ct. 1058 (No. 07-526).
214. See Brief for Respondents at 9–11, Carcieri, 555 U.S. __, 129 S.Ct. 1058 (No. 07-526)
(providing a summary of the Secretary’s argument).
215. See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 213, at 41–43.
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“[n]one of the parties or amici, including the Narragansett tribe itself,
has argued that the tribe was under federal jurisdiction in 1934.”216
Justice Breyer concurred, finding that although the IRA’s legislative
history demonstrated Congress’s intent for the statute to apply only to
tribes under federal jurisdiction in 1934, such an interpretation “may
prove somewhat less restrictive than it at first appears,”217 since a tribe
may have been under federal jurisdiction in 1934 even though the
federal government did not list it as so at the time.218 In Breyer’s view,
the IRA placed no time limit on recognition, and thus later recognition
could reflect earlier jurisdiction.219 He concluded, however, that there
was no reason to believe that the Narragansett tribe was under such
federal jurisdiction in 1934.220 Justice Souter agreed with Justice Breyer
that tribes could have been under federal jurisdiction in 1934 even if the
federal government was ignorant of that fact, but argued that because the
Narragansett tribe had no opportunity to argue a particular construction
of the “jurisdiction” phrase, the case called for remand.221
Finally, Justice Stevens dissented, arguing that the Narragansett tribe
qualified as a “tribe” within the meaning of the IRA222 and that
“[f]ederal recognition, regardless of when it is conferred, is the
necessary condition that triggers a tribe’s eligibility to receive trust
land.”223 Justice Stevens noted that Section 5 of the IRA allows the
Secretary to take land in trust for Indian tribes, and requiring that a tribe
be an “Indian tribe” simply requires that the tribe be formally recognized
as such.224 In short, Justice Stevens argued that “[i]f a tribe satisfies the
stringent criteria established by the Secretary to qualify for federal
recognition . . . it is a fortiori an ‘Indian tribe’ as a matter of law.”225

216. Carcieri, 555 U.S. at __, 129 S. Ct. at 1068.
217. Id. at __, 129 S. Ct. at 1069 (Breyer, J., concurring).
218. Id. See also Brief of Law Professors, supra note 137, at 22–24, 2008 WL 3991411, at *22–
24 (noting that no comprehensive list of federally recognized tribes existed at the time of enactment
of the IRA; that upon creation of such a list, numerous tribes were mistakenly omitted; and that
several of the omitted tribes have subsequently been recognized by actions of Congress or the
executive).
219. Carcieri, 555 U.S. at __, 129 S. Ct. at 1070 (Breyer, J., concurring).
220. Id.
221. Id. at __, 129 S. Ct. at 1071 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
222. Id. at __, 129 S. Ct. at 1072 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ( “The plain text of the [IRA] clearly
authorizes the Secretary to take land into trust for Indian tribes as well as individual Indians, and it
places no temporal limitation on the definition of ‘Indian Tribe.’”).
223. Id. at __, 129 S. Ct. at 1075 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
224. Id.
225. Id.
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C.

The Carcieri Rule Has Important Implications for Future Cases
Involving Tribes Recognized After 1934

When it established a rule that tribes must prove they were under
federal jurisdiction in 1934 to qualify under the IRA’s trust-land
provisions, Carcieri—for the first time since the IRA took effect—
decoupled federal recognition from federal jurisdiction.226 Because the
majority opinion does not differentiate between tribes included in the
1934 IRA list and those recognized after, courts might interpret Carcieri
to require all tribes—even those listed in 1934—to prove federal
jurisdiction whenever applying under the Act’s trust-land provisions.
Such an interpretation calls into question the ability of all recognized
tribes to utilize the IRA.
An alternative reading, however, is to view Carcieri as standing for
the more narrow proposition that only tribes recognized after 1934,
either under 25 C.F.R. Part 83 (as the Narragansett tribe was) or through
traditional methods, must demonstrate federal jurisdiction separately
from formal recognition.227 While the Court’s decoupled approach
suggests that proof of federal recognition is not enough in itself to
establish that a tribe was under federal jurisdiction in 1934, it leaves
open the possibility that tribes might be able to demonstrate such
jurisdiction through additional evidence.228 The Court did not give the
Narragansett tribe a chance to present such evidence, but in future cases
tribes could presumably introduce at the outset of litigation evidence that
federal jurisdiction existed in 1934 despite federal recognition occurring

226. A search of the leading treatise, cases, and articles on the subject failed to reveal another
case where federal jurisdiction was considered separately from recognition for purposes of the
IRA’s trust-land provisions. See COHEN, supra note 15, § 15.07[1][a], at 1010 (“The IRA applies to
all Indian tribes, whether recognized in 1934, or subsequently acknowledged by Congress or the
executive.”). During oral arguments in Carcieri, counsel for the government expressed the belief
that “the Secretary’s interpretation from the beginning . . . has understood recognition and under
Federal jurisdiction at least with respect to tribes to be one and the same.” See Transcript of Oral
Argument, supra note 213, at 42. As Justice Souter noted in Carcieri, “[g]iven the Secretary’s
position, it is not surprising that neither he nor the Tribe raised a claim that the Tribe was under
federal jurisdiction in 1934: they simply failed to address an issue that no party understood to be
present.” Carcieri, 555 U.S. at __, 129 S. Ct. at 1071 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
227. The Narragansett tribe was recognized under 25 C.F.R. Part 83 and yet the Court determined
that it had not proven it was under federal jurisdiction in 1934. See Carcieri, 555 U.S. at __, 129 S.
Ct. at 1068.
228. See id. at __, 129 S. Ct. at 1068 (concluding that “[n]one of the parties or amici, including
the Narragansett Tribe itself, has argued that the Tribe was under federal jurisdiction in 1934”). This
implies that tribes might prove jurisdiction by introducing evidence above and beyond the mere fact
of their recognition under 25 C.F.R. Part 83.
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after that time.229 Carcieri will thus effectively result in courts treating
tribes unequally under the IRA by imposing a higher evidentiary bar on
tribes recognized after 1934.230
Furthermore, Carcieri leaves the Department of the Interior and
Congress in a difficult position because the government has long utilized
the IRA to take land into trust for tribes recognized through 25 C.F.R.
Part 83—including the Narragansett.231 The effects on the Narragansett
tribe are dramatic: its request to have land held in trust must be denied,
and the land in question cannot be deemed “Indian country” subject to
federal jurisdiction and protection.232 The tribe’s thirty-one-acre parcel is
now equivalent to a non-Indian owner’s land, meaning it is subject to
state jurisdiction, laws, and taxation.233 In sum, regardless of how courts
interpret Carcieri, its implications are great.
VI. COURTS AND CONGRESS SHOULD ACT TO LESSEN
CARCIERI’S IMPACT ON TRIBES AND THE FEDERALTRIBAL TRUST RELATIONSHIP
The Carcieri Court, absent briefing by the parties on the issue, found
that the Narragansett tribe, which was recognized under 25 C.F.R. Part
83, had not proven it was “under federal jurisdiction” in 1934—now a
requirement to qualify for the IRA’s trust-land provisions. The Court
ignored the fact that federal recognition under 25 C.F.R. Part 83 requires
tribes to demonstrate that they were under a broad form of federal
jurisdiction prior to 1934. Federally recognized tribes, regardless of the
date of their recognition, have already shown historical existence as
communities and identification as American Indian entities under the
broad federal jurisdiction established by the plenary power doctrine and
the federal-tribal trust relationship. Underscoring this notion, since it
229. In the future, tribes should present evidence of jurisdiction before they reach the Supreme
Court, as the Court showed an unwillingness to remand for production of such evidence in Carcieri.
230. Tribes organized and recognized under the IRA of 1934, such as the Cheyenne River Sioux
tribe, will likely be presumed to have existed under federal jurisdiction in 1934. Tribes recognized
after 1934, such as the Narragansett tribe, will be required to show additional evidence that they
were under federal jurisdiction in 1934.
231. See supra Part IV for examples of tribes recognized after 1934 having land held in trust
under the IRA; see supra Part V.A for a description of the Narragansett tribe’s successful petition to
have its 1800 acres of settlement lands held in trust under the IRA.
232. See supra Part I.C (describing federal preemption of state law in Indian country).
233. See COHEN, supra note 15, § 6.01[5], at 513 (“In Indian law, the pervasiveness of tribal
governing authority and the preclusion of state jurisdiction are manifested primarily within Indian
country. With respect to events occurring outside Indian country, however, nondiscriminatory state
laws have been held to apply unless federal law provides otherwise.”).

082610 Washburn Final.docx (Do Not Delete)

8/30/2010 8:20 AM

638

[Vol. 85:603

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

went into effect, tribes recognized for purposes of the IRA have always
qualified for IRA benefits without having to separately prove federal
jurisdiction.234 Recognition has always been enough. Carcieri changed
that.
Courts can interpret the opinion in different ways.235 While the
Carcieri Court did not specifically address how its analysis might apply
to tribes included on the 1934 list, Justice Breyer’s concurrence suggests
that the Court meant to distinguish between tribes listed in 1934 and
those recognized later. It indicates that the Court assumed that tribes
included on the 1934 list met the IRA’s jurisdictional requirements.236
However, decoupling recognition and jurisdiction for some tribes and
not others conflicts with Congress’s 1994 amendment expressly
forbidding such discrimination.237 Thus, until and unless Congress says
otherwise, Carcieri’s conclusion that the Narragansett tribe failed to
satisfy the IRA’s jurisdiction requirement should be interpreted as
narrowly as possible. This is appropriate because the Court did not
discuss the effect of the 25 C.F.R. Part 83 recognition.238 Instead, the
Court relied upon the fact that the federal government and the
Narragansetts failed to contest the allegation that the tribe was not under
federal jurisdiction in 1934.239
Congress should respond to Carcieri with legislation that corrects the
Court’s misstep and mandates that all federally recognized tribes be

234. See supra notes 142–44 and accompanying text (noting that prior to the Carcieri decision,
the federal government did not require recognized tribes to show separate evidence of federal
jurisdiction in 1934 to qualify for benefits under the IRA).
235. The broadest of these interpretations is that all recognized tribes must prove jurisdiction
separately from recognition—even those included on the 1934 list. Such an interpretation would
clearly contradict Congress’s intent and more than seventy years of government action. See supra
Part III.B (describing Congress’s intent in enacting the IRA) and Part IV.A–B (demonstrating that
the federal government has recognized tribes since 1934 and has held land in trust for such tribes
under the IRA). While it is unlikely the Court had such an absurd result in mind, the possibility
underscores the need for congressional response.
236. See Carcieri v. Salazar, 555 U.S. __ (Feb. 24, 2009), 129 S. Ct. 1058, 1069 (2009) (Breyer,
J., concurring) (noting that “following the Indian Reorganization Act’s enactment, the Department
[of the Interior] compiled a list of 258 tribes covered by the Act”). This statement suggests a
distinction between tribes included in the 1934 list (those covered by the Act) and tribes recognized
after 1934.
237. See supra Part III.B (describing the congressional intent underlying the 1994 IRA
amendment).
238. However, counsel for the Secretary told the Court at oral argument that the Secretary’s
position had always been that federal recognition and jurisdiction were “one and the same” for IRA
purposes and asked for a remand on the jurisdiction question. See Transcript of Oral Argument,
supra note 213, at 42.
239. See Carcieri, 555 U.S. at __, 129 S. Ct. at 1068.
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recognized as existing under federal jurisdiction in 1934 for purposes of
the IRA. Until then, however, courts should find that tribes formally
recognized through either inclusion on the IRA’s 1934 list or traditional
recognition methods after 1934 satisfy Carcieri’s primary holding that to
qualify under the IRA’s trust-land provisions, tribes must prove they
were under federal jurisdiction in 1934. Those tribes should not be
required to demonstrate 1934 jurisdiction separately from recognition.
For tribes recognized through 25 C.F.R. Part 83, courts should
distinguish Carcieri because the Narragansett tribe did not present, and
the Court did not consider, jurisdictional evidence. Courts should
consider such evidence when considering IRA trust-provision claims on
behalf of 25 C.F.R. Part 83 tribes and decide on a case-by-case basis
whether federal jurisdiction existed in 1934. For all other recognized
tribes, courts should acknowledge the long-standing practice of coupling
recognition and federal jurisdiction for purposes of the IRA. Such an
approach minimizes the risk of additional harm to tribal interests and
complies with the basic tenets of Indian law and congressional intent.
A.

Courts Should Find that Any Federally Recognized Tribe,
Regardless of Its Date of Recognition, Was Under Federal
Jurisdiction in 1934

Traditional recognition processes, based on long-standing treaty rights
or other historical relationships with the United States, require that tribes
show they were under federal jurisdiction since at least the time of
establishment of the relationship.240 Thus, all traditionally recognized
tribes should qualify under the IRA. In addition, the 25 C.F.R. Part 83
recognition process is consistent with the IRA’s definition of “tribe”
because tribes must meet certain criteria under 25 C.F.R. Part 83 that
necessarily show they were under federal jurisdiction since at least 1900.
Since 1934, the Department of the Interior has allowed tribes recognized
through traditional means or 25 C.F.R. Part 83 to have land held in trust
under the IRA, demonstrating that the federal government views such
tribal recognition as sufficient for eligibility under the IRA.
While the Carcieri Court did not address the issue directly, tribes
recognized since 1934 based on traditional processes that consider longstanding but overlooked treaty rights also qualify as “tribes” under the
IRA.241 Treaty-making ceased in 1871, which means that treaty rights
240. See supra Part III.A (describing traditional methods of recognition).
241. See supra Part III.A (describing traditional recognition based on treaty rights against the
United States).
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against the United States were established before that date. Thus,
modern-day recognition based on such treaty rights establishes that the
federal government had jurisdiction over those tribes dating back at least
as far as the date of the treaty.
Other historical relationships between tribes and the federal
government also suffice to show that the federal government had
jurisdiction over those tribes since at least the relationship’s founding, as
the government has repeatedly acknowledged since 1934.242 Whether
based on treaty, statute, agreement, or other means, traditional methods
of recognition implicitly acknowledge that the federal government long
ago established jurisdiction over a tribe in the broad sense of jurisdiction
conferred by constitutional and extra-constitutional sources of plenary
power.243 The federal government’s power to “establish and
maintain . . . political relations with Indian tribes derives from the
Constitution’s Indian commerce clause,”244 which is a key source of the
government’s plenary power over tribes.245 Thus, tribes acknowledged to
have historical ties to the federal government were subject to its
jurisdiction at the inception of the federal-tribal relationship.
Likewise, a tribe utilizing 25 C.F.R. Part 83 must prove identification
as an American Indian entity on a substantially continuous basis since
1900 and existence as a community from historical times until the
present.246 Meeting that requirement demonstrates that since at least
1900, the government possessed plenary power over a tribe’s affairs
under the broad preconstitutional “national” powers conferred upon the
newly established United States.247 The United States had the power to
deal or refuse to deal with such tribes as it saw fit, and thus these tribes
were necessarily subject to federal jurisdiction. The federal government
has recognized sixteen tribes through the 25 C.F.R. Part 83 process since
1978, and “[t]o gain recognition, each of these tribes was required to
demonstrate that, from historical times to the present, it maintained a
continuous existence as a distinct Indian community and exercised

242. See supra Part IV.A (providing examples of the federal government’s recognition of tribes
by traditional means after 1934 and subsequent holding of land in trust for those tribes under the
IRA).
243. See supra Part I (describing the broad implications of federal plenary power and federal
jurisdiction in Indian country).
244. COHEN, supra note 15, § 3.02[4], at 140.
245. See supra Part I.A (describing constitutional sources of plenary power).
246. See 25 C.F.R. § 83.7 (2009).
247. See supra Part I.A (describing the broad preconstitutional powers that the U.S. inherited
upon nationhood).
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political authority over its members.”248 These requirements establish
that qualifying tribes were under federal jurisdiction in that they existed
in 1934 and were subject to federal plenary power under the Indian
Commerce Clause, the Treaty Clause, and the government’s broad,
inherited, preconstitutional powers. The current requirements for
recognition thus encompass the IRA’s definition of “Indian”249 and
should be sufficient for proving federal jurisdiction in 1934 and allowing
newly recognized tribes to have land taken into trust by the federal
government.
The Department of the Interior has adopted the position that later
recognition reflects earlier federal jurisdiction. For example, the federal
government recognized the Stillaguamish Tribe in 1976 based partly on
the fact that the tribe had maintained treaty fishing rights against the
United States.250 The Department subsequently concluded that the
government could take land into trust for the tribe under the IRA.251
Similarly, the federal government recognized the Grand Traverse Band
of Ottawa Indians in 1980 under the federal government’s new
recognition procedures,252 and the Department has since taken multiple
parcels of land into trust for the tribe under the provisions of the IRA.253
Because the IRA “imposes no time limit upon recognition,”254 tribes that
can establish through later recognition that some form of federal
jurisdiction existed in 1934 should be able to qualify under the IRA’s
trust-land provisions. Courts should not controvert the Department’s
policy of coupling recognition with jurisdiction, as tribes have relied on

248. See Brief of Law Professors, supra note 137, at 6, 2008 WL 3991411, at *6.
249. See Wheeler-Howard (Indian Reorganization) Act, Pub. L. No. 73-383, § 19, 48 Stat. 984,
988 (1934) (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 479 (2006)).
250. See Letter from Kent Frizzell, Acting Secretary of the Interior, to David H. Getches, Esquire,
Native American Rights Fund at 1 (Oct. 27, 1976) (on file with author).
251. See supra note 162 and accompanying text.
252. See Determination for Federal Acknowledgment of the Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa and
Chippewa Indians as an Indian Tribe, 45 Fed. Reg. 19,321 (Mar. 25, 1980). The Grand Traverse
Band was the first tribe to be recognized under the government’s formal administrative recognition
process, adopted in 1978. See supra Part IV.B (describing the government’s adoption of the new
recognition process, which is codified as amended at 25 C.F.R. Part 83, and the recognition of the
Grand Traverse Band). The Grand Traverse Band was recognized based on its satisfaction of the
criteria contained in 25 C.F.R. § 54.7, which was a precursor to the modern 25 C.F.R. Part 83. See
Federal Acknowledgement of the Grand Traverse Band, 45 Fed. Reg. at 19,321; Procedures for
Establishing that an American Indian Group Exists as a Tribe, 25 C.F.R. § 54.7 (1980).
253. See supra note 176 and accompanying text.
254. Carcieri v. Salazar, 555 U.S. __ (Feb. 24, 2009), 129 S. Ct. 1058, 1070 (2009) (Breyer, J.,
concurring).
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having land held in trust upon recognition since the IRA was enacted in
1934.255
Courts should also interpret Carcieri’s rule—that to qualify under the
IRA’s trust provisions, a tribe must have been under federal jurisdiction
in 1934—as including tribes recognized since 1934 because doing
otherwise defies the Indian law canons of construction that require
courts to respect the federal-tribal trust relationship. The canons, a
manifestation of the federal-tribal trust relationship,256 bind the courts
and suggest that at the very least, the IRA should be “construed liberally
in favor of the Indians”257 to accomplish its purposes of protecting and
providing land for Indians. The federal trust relationship, and the canons
of construction “interpreting federal action toward Indians expressed in
treaties, agreements, statutes, executive orders, and administrative
regulations in light of the government’s obligation to protect tribal
sovereignty and property,”258 counsel against barring tribes recognized
after 1934 from having land held in trust under Section 5 of the IRA.259
Even though the government recognized the Narragansett tribe under
25 C.F.R. Part 83, the Carcieri Court found that the tribe had not proven
it was under federal jurisdiction in 1934. However, the tribe never
argued—and the Court never considered—jurisdictional evidence to the
contrary.260 Therefore, the Court’s decision that the Narragansett tribe
failed to satisfy the 1934 federal jurisdiction requirement should be
interpreted as standing merely for the notion that, unless or until
Congress says otherwise, 25 C.F.R. Part 83 recognition on its own is not
enough to prove a tribe was under federal jurisdiction in 1934. That does
not mean that tribes recognized under 25 C.F.R. Part 83 were not under
255. See supra Part III.C (describing the federal government’s historical policy of coupling
jurisdiction with recognition for purposes of the IRA).
256. See supra Part II.B (describing the four basic Indian law canons of construction).
257. County of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 502 U.S.
251, 269 (1992) (citing Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe, 471 U.S. 759, 766 (1985)).
258. COHEN, supra note 15, § 5.04[4][a], at 420.
259. Congress has recognized the issues created by Carcieri; Senate Bill 1703, a bill “[t]o amend
the Act of June 18, 1934, to reaffirm the authority of the Secretary of the Interior to take land into
trust for Indian tribes,” was introduced on September 24, 2009. The bill, if passed, would amend the
IRA of 1934 by striking the term “any recognized Indian tribe now under Federal jurisdiction” and
inserting “any federally recognized Indian tribe.” See S. 1703, 111th Cong. § 1 (as reported by S.
Comm.
on
Indian
Affairs,
Dec.
17,
2009);
see
also
GovTrack,
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=s111-1703 (last visited May 4, 2010) (providing upto-date information on Senate Bill 1703’s status in Congress, including the date it was reported by
the Senate Committee on Indian Affairs).
260. See supra Part V.B (describing the Court’s refusal to remand the case to be litigated on the
jurisdiction issue).
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federal jurisdiction in 1934; it simply means they still need to prove it
for purposes of the IRA trust provisions. A tribe might demonstrate 1934
jurisdiction by supplying the evidence it used to attain federal
recognition under 25 C.F.R. Part 83 or other traditional recognition
methods.261 Thus, courts should consider such evidence to determine
whether a tribe was under federal jurisdiction in 1934 for purposes of the
IRA.
B.

Congress Should Remedy Carcieri Because It Contradicts Policies
Underlying the IRA and the 25 C.F.R. Part 83 Recognition Process
and Undermines the Federal-Tribal Trust Relationship

The federal policies and purposes that led Congress to enact the IRA
support an interpretation of “tribe” that includes tribes recognized after
1934. Similarly, the policies underlying 25 C.F.R. Part 83 emphasize
inclusion of such tribes when distributing federal benefits. The federaltribal trust relationship underlies both the IRA and 25 C.F.R. Part 83,
and the basic duties and obligations created by this relationship should
motivate Congress to pass the remedial bill currently in committee.
The government actors responsible for the Indian New Deal and the
IRA recognized that decades of federal policies designed to assimilate
Indians and destroy their cultural and religious traditions had caused
great damage to tribal culture and land base.262 The 1928 Meriam
Report, which provided the impetus for much of the IRA, established
that many Indians were living on lands of little value, while better lands
had fallen into the hands of white settlers; that the policy of allotment
had failed to protect the Indian land base; and that federal Indian policy
had severely compromised Indian health, education, and economic
development.263 During the Indian New Deal, “[f]or the first time, the
federal government would encourage development of tribal

261. The Carcieri Court left the door open for tribes recognized under 25 C.F.R. Part 83 to prove
federal jurisdiction existed in 1934. See Carcieri v. Salazar, 555 U.S. __ (Feb. 24, 2009), 129 S. Ct.
1058, 1068 (2009) (“None of the parties or amici, including the Narragansett Tribe itself, has argued
that the Tribe was under federal jurisdiction in 1934.”). This statement implies that other tribes,
regardless of how or when they were recognized, could introduce evidence of such federal
jurisdiction in order to qualify under the IRA’s trust-land provisions. Tribal attorneys should take
note of this critical implication.
262. See 78 CONG. REC. 11,123 (1934) (statement of Sen. Wheeler) (“[H]eretofore there has been
pursued a policy whereby . . . the Indians would find themselves without land and
pauperized . . . . [T]here are many Indians who have no lands whatsoever, and are unable to make a
living.”).
263. See Meriam Report, supra note 113, at 3–8.
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governments, economies, and cultures.”264 By passing the IRA,
Congress intended to further these goals and to preserve tribal culture
and organization; the drafters described the new legislation as an act
“[t]o conserve and develop Indian lands and resources; to extend to
Indians the right to form businesses and other organizations . . . and for
other purposes.”265
Congress’s concern for the well-being of tribes, expressed in both the
Congressional Record for the IRA266 and in the Act itself, is inconsistent
with a desire to exclude tribes simply because the government failed to
include them in its hastily compiled list of “recognized” tribes in 1934.
In addition, because no comprehensive list of federally recognized tribes
existed prior to enactment of the IRA in 1934,267 and because no formal
process for recognizing tribes emerged until decades later,268 it is
unlikely that the Congress that enacted the IRA would have intended to
exclude tribes mistakenly left off the list.269
The 1994 IRA amendment also demonstrates congressional intent to
include, rather than exclude, recognized tribes when distributing federal
benefits.270 Congress has evidenced a preference to treat recognized
tribes as equals where federal benefits are concerned, regardless of date
or method of recognition.271 Carcieri undermines congressional intent by
drawing an arbitrary line between tribes recognized in 1934 and those

264. ANDERSON, supra note 56, at 128. See also 78 CONG. REC. 11,123 (1934) (statement of Sen.
Wheeler) (describing the purposes and goals of the IRA, including support for tribal selfgovernment and economic development).
265. Wheeler-Howard (Indian Reorganization) Act, Pub. L. No. 73-383, 48 Stat. 984 (1934)
(codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 461–479 (2006)).
266. The Congressional Record describes Congress’s intent “to conserve and develop Indian
lands and resources . . . to provide for higher education for Indians, to extend toward Indians the
right to form business and other organizations, and for other purposes.” See 78 CONG. REC. 11,122
(1934) (statement of Sen. Wheeler).
267. See supra Part III.C (describing the lack of a formal list of recognized tribes prior to 1934).
268. See supra Part IV.B (describing the formal administrative recognition process established by
25 C.F.R. Part 83).
269. In fact, during consideration of the IRA bill by the Senate, Senator Wheeler acknowledged
that the bill, if passed, would be generally applicable to Indians throughout the country. See 78
CONG. REC. 11,122 (1934) (statement of Sen. Wheeler) (responding to question by Senator
McNary).
270. See supra Part III.B (describing Congress’s intent in amending the IRA).
271. See 140 CONG. REC. 11,376, 11,377 (May 23, 1994) (statement of Rep. Richardson)
(“Whatever the method by which recognition was extended, all Indian tribes enjoy the same
relationship with the United States and exercise the same inherent authority . . . . [the 1994
amendment] is intended to prohibit the Secretary or any other Federal official from distinguishing
between Indian tribes or classifying them not only on the basis of the IRA but also on the basis of
any other Federal law.”).
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recognized later. A bill currently in committee that would remedy the
problems arising from Carcieri supports this conclusion. The bill
reiterates what Congress and the Department of the Interior have
acknowledged for decades: that “any federally recognized Indian tribe”
is eligible to receive IRA benefits.272
Congress’s purpose in developing a federal scheme for recognizing
tribes does not support the idea that simply because a tribe was
mistakenly left off the list of recognized tribes in 1934, it should be
excluded from the beneficial trust-land provisions of the IRA.
Procedures and policies for recognizing that an existing Indian group is a
“tribe” are set forth in 25 C.F.R. Part 83; these procedures affirm that a
government-to-government relationship exists between the tribe and the
United States, thus entitling the tribe to the “immunities and privileges
available to other federally acknowledged Indian tribes . . . .”273 Such
immunities and privileges include the “protection, services, and benefits
of the Federal government available to Indian tribes by virtue of their
status as tribes”274 and presumably would include entitlement to have
land held in trust by the government pursuant to the IRA. Like the IRA
and its amendments, 25 C.F.R. Part 83 emphasizes equal treatment
among federally recognized tribes, supporting the idea that tribes
recognized since 1934 should have the same access to the IRA’s trustland provisions as tribes included on the 1934 list.
Additionally, Congress should take legislative action to address
Carcieri because under the federal-tribal trust relationship, the federal
government owes certain duties and obligations to recognized Indian
tribes.275 The trust relationship provides the lens through which all of
Indian law must be viewed; the government’s power to manage Indian
affairs is balanced by the duty to protect and respect tribal sovereignty
and property.276 Many statutes, court decisions, and presidential policy
statements reflect this special relationship,277 demonstrating that all three
branches of government are bound by the principle that tribes are to be
treated as beneficiaries of the federal-tribal trust relationship. The IRA
itself reflects the trust relationship in its focus on protection of the tribal
land base and promotion of tribal self-government; similarly, the 25
272. See S. 1703, 111th Cong. § 1 (as reported by S. Comm. on Indian Affairs, Dec. 17, 2009).
273. 25 C.F.R. § 83.2 (2009).
274. Id.
275. See supra Part II (describing the federal obligations stemming from the historical federaltribal trust relationship).
276. See COHEN, supra note 15, § 5.04[4][a], at 420.
277. See id. at 420–21.
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C.F.R. Part 83 recognition process acknowledges that recognition by the
federal government entitles tribes to the immunities and privileges
enjoyed by other federally recognized tribes.278 The policies and
purposes behind the federal-tribal trust relationship weigh heavily
against punishing tribes for mere governmental mistake and
inadvertence, and Congress should act to support this cornerstone of
Indian law. If Congress fails to take action, Carcieri will continue to
erode basic Indian law principles and undercut congressional policy and
intent.
CONCLUSION
The Carcieri decision potentially divides American Indian tribes into
two classes: those included in the IRA list, and those recognized since
1934 based on traditional recognition methods or the 25 C.F.R. Part 83
process. This division is arbitrary, as each group must meet the same
basic criteria for recognition. All federally recognized tribes were under
federal jurisdiction in 1934 in the broad sense that federal plenary power
and trust relationship principles governed federal relations with existing
tribes. To qualify for recognition, tribes must show historical existence
as American Indian entities and existence as communities from
historical times until the present, and Congress has clearly expressed that
such proof satisfies the IRA.
The purposes underlying the IRA, the criteria imposed by federal
recognition procedures, and long-standing principles of federal Indian
law suggest that tribes formally recognized after 1934 should be entitled
to benefits stemming from the trust-land provisions of Section 5 of the
IRA. If interpreted to exclude such tribes from obtaining these benefits,
the Court’s decision in Carcieri v. Salazar will contradict Department of
the Interior policies as well as Indian law canons of construction. Such
an interpretation will subject tribes to discriminating treatment. In
allowing recognized tribes to have land held in trust under the IRA, the
Department of the Interior has embraced the protective principles
implicit in federal plenary power and the federal-tribal trust relationship.
Congress and the courts should act to ensure that Carcieri does not
override that policy.

278. See 25 C.F.R. § 83.2.

